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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction
A • General Comments
Since 1950, investment officers of life insurance
h8ve been harassed by a series of staggering problems which
have been entirely new and strange to them. Early in the
thirties came the tidal wave of bond defaults, particularly
in the case of the railroads. (At the end of 1935, defaulted
bonds in the portfolio of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company totaled almost fifty million dollars, four-fifths of
them being railroad bonds.) (1) Just as the difficulties
caused by the defaults were partially cleared away, life
insurance companies found themselves wallowing in a buyers'
market for credit which has been continuing for twelve years,
and during which interest rates have fallen off sharply.
Concurrently with the difficulties caused by declining inter-
est rates, insurance companies found themselves plagued by
another depression ef terma th-the enforced write-down of
security holdings. (Metropolitan’s gross write-down totaled
£173,884,000 at the end of 1942; of this amount C’165,474,000,
involved railroad bonds.) (2) Although such declines in
value were tentative or paper losses only until the securities
concerned were disposed of, many companies, unlike the Met-
ropolitan did not have the courage to hold the depreciated
(1) Marquis James, The Metropolitan Life-The Viking Press,
New York, 1947. Page 288.
(2) Ibid , pp. 375-377.
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bonds until improved market and business conditions had
driven their values up to par, and, by selling, assumed an
actual loss on the items disposed of.
Furthermore, the purchase by United States life
insurance companies of huge quantities of United States
Government Bonds issued to finance World War II brought into
their investment portfolios low-yield securities which, at
the end of 1945, amounted to over fifty per cent of their
total holdings. Finally, to aggravate still further invest-
ment problems of these institutions, their assets, as well as
their policy reserves, more than doubled during the period
1930-1945, thereby making necessary the intensification of
the search for profitable and sound investments for the
rapidly swelling funds held by these companies. Of all the
factors mentioned above it appears that the primary and basic
problem which has influenced and controlled, directly and in-
directly, investment policies of life insurance companies for
the last fifteen years has been the declining rate of
interest. Moreover most institutional investors will agree
with Mr. Arthur B. Wood, President and Managing Director of
the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, who stated in his
1945 report to his company's policyholders that the problem
of declining interest rates is the "greatest single issue
facing the Life Assurance Companies today." (1)
(1) Arthur B. Wood, Sun Life Report s to You 1945 , Page 13.
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5Mr. Wood went on to say:
The future course of interest rates is a
matter for conjecture, but the indications
are that we are faced with a long period
of low interest rates. Life Assurance
Companies must always be prepared to adapt
their practices to conform with changing
conditions, and with the prospect of the
continuance of low interest rates for an
indefinite period it is s ound policy to
build up substantial surplus and con-
tingency funds. (1)
What a contrast there is between the interest
situation today and that of thirty-five years ago when
Mr. Lawrence Chamberlain predicted that.
For the indefinite future a return
averaging at least 4% will probably
be demanded of money to the loan of
which there is attached a commercial
risk! (2)
To be sure, there is no unanimity of opinion to-
day among economists, bankers, and investment specialists
as to just where we stand on the matter of bond prices, nor
on what the future holds as to bond yields. Speaking at the
16th Annual Conference of the Harvard Business School Alumni
Association on June 8, 1946, Mr. ' John H. Williams, Vice Pres-
ident of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Dean of the
Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration said that he
could see nothing on the immediate horizon to cause a
reversal of the downward trend of interest rates, and that a
(1) Ibid, Page 13
(2) Lawrence Chamberlain , Principles of Bond Investment
Henry Holt and Company, New York, New York, 1911
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4two percent rate would be quite possible. In contrast to
this prediction, Mr. Barnett Ravits pointed out on
July 29, 1946 that an increase in productive loans had appar-
ently caused a "firming of money charges" which could be ex-
pected to continue as long as that situation persisted and
added that "prospects of a sharp rise this year (1946) in
bank loans to Indus try especially heighten the probability
of a hardening of high-grade bond yields." (1) Then, in
October 1946, Mr. J. H. Riddle, Vice President and Economist
of the Bankers Trust Company of New York predicted that long-
term interest rates would not rise much above current levels
for some time to come, (2) whereas, only a week or s o
earlier, Murray Sheilds of the Bank of the Manhattan Company
had expressed the opinion that the trend of long and short-
term interest rates should be upward. (3)
Moreover, as will be discussed more fully later,
the "cheap money" policy of the United States Treasury has
been an important factor in keeping rates low, not only on
the large volume of government bonds held by insurance com-
panies, but on the other securities in their portfolios as
well. President Truman, in his message to Congress in January
1946, gave support to the continuation of the policy of low
interest, when he said,
(1) Barron f s Financia l Weekly -July 29, 1946-Page 11.
(2) Edson B. Smith, "The Investor
,
" Boston Herald,
October 30, 1946.
(3) Murray Shields, Inflation, Interes t Rates and Investment
Policy
,
Bank of the Manhattan Company, New York 1946.
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Low interest rates will be an important
force in promoting the full production and
full employment in the postwar period for
which we are all striving, (1)
and as recently as October 1946, Mr. J. H. Riddle of Bankers
Trust Company New York, in a speech in Boston, stated.
It seems unlikely that the rate on
Government issues will rise above 2b%, at
least as far ahead as we now can see. (2)
It appears, therefore, that no relief in this direction can
be expected for the time being.
Such have been the investment problems confronting
life insurance companies during the past fifteen years, and
such have been the forces influencing and shaping the invest-
ment practices of these large financial institutions during
this period.
Before attempting to analyze and discuss in detail
the investment trends and policies of life insurance companies
since 1930, clarification of some of the most frequently used
terminology which will be found herein is desirable.
(1) "The Eonomy in War and Transiti on-A Review of 1945,"
Survey of Current Bus in ess
,
February 1946.
(2) Ed son B. Smith, "The Investor," Boston Herald,
October 30, 1946.
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6B. Defini tlona
1. Life Insurance Company
Although the nature and functions of institutions
designated as life insurance companies are common knowledge,
a few words are required to distinguish between the so-called
"Stock Companies" and the "Mutual Companies," the two prin-
cipal types* The formersne organized by stockholders who
subscribe the necessary funds to launch the business, con-
trol the company and share in the distribution of any profits.
The second type, on the other hand is a "cooperative assoc-
iation of persons established for the purpose of effecting
insurance on their own lives," (1) any profits of which are
distributed to policyholders in the form of dividends. Most
of the data compiled for this report concern mutual companies,
but the aggregate figures from certain statistical sources
cover the stock companies as well. At the end of 1945, life
insurance held by mutual companies represented 10%o of the
total in force, and stock companies accounted for 30%. (2)
Common usuage permits the dropping of the word "insurance,"
and the shortened form-"life company"-will be found frequently
throughout this report.
2. Mortgage Bonds versus Debenture bonds
Mortgage bonds are those obligations secured by
the pledge of specific property as a guaranty of payment,
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, Life Insurance , Sixth Edition.
McGraw-IIill Book Company, Inc., New York 1945-Tage 18.
(2) Life Insurance Fact Book 1946, Institute of Life
Insurance, New York, 1946.
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7whereas debenture bonds
,
or debentures bs they are usually
called, generally are unsecured promises. Some of the latter,
however, because of the absence of prior obligations, have a
senior claim, while other debentures may become secured, under
the "equal coverage" clause included in some indentures if
mortgage bonds are issued subsequent to them. (1)
3. Funded Debt-Sinking Fund
Technically, the term "funded debt" is limited to
bonds and other similar obligations which require the estab-
lishment of a fund, called a sinking fund, to be built up
during the life of the issue sufficient to retire all or part
of it by maturity. The term is used loosely to refer to all
long-term bonds and notes as distinguished from current or
short-term indebtedness.
4. Inc enture
T-iis is the written instrument or agreement be-
tween the borrower and the trustee which sets forth the rate
of interest and other terms of a bond issue, and which, in
the case of mortgage bonds, transfers title to the pledged
property to the trustee as long as the bonds issued there-
under are outstanding.
5. Gross Revenues
These include total receipts directly attributable
(1) David F. Jordan, J ordan on Investments , Fourth Revised
Edition. Prentice-Mall, Inc. New York, 1941. PP. 19-20.
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8to the operation of an enterprise. Income from investments
and similar mis cells ne ous receipts generally are not included
but are classified as “other income."
6. Equity
This term refers to the common stockholders’
interest in a company. It is the sum of the common stock
account (market or book value) and the surplus accounts.
7 • Net Pr ope r ty
To arrive at the value of net property, the
Reserves for Depreciation, Retirement and any similar val-
uation reserve are deducted from the total of the property
account as shown by the company’s books (gross book value.)
Further adjustments are frequently made to eliminate appraisal
write-ups and similar items which have inflated the property
ac counts •
8. Led ger Assets versus Admitted Assets
Ledger assets
,
as the name implies, are those
shown on the books of the company and must be supported by
statements, on a cash bais, of income and disbursements.
Admit ted a ssets
,
on the other hard are those values which the
state insurance commissioners say may be properly considered
as real resources of t he company. They include values for
bonds 8rd stocks on the basis prescribed by state regulation
which may or may not be the cost of amortized values, and
good assets not yet received or entered on the ledge
(Interest due or accrued.) They exclude assets shown on the
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9ledger which are not considered good assets by state
insurance commissioners (cash advanced to agents and over-
due rents.) (1)
9. Par Va lue
Par value is the nominal value of a security, ie
.
,
the principal amount which will be paid by the issuing com-
pany upon maturity or redemption thereof, without consider-
ation or inclusion of accrued interest or redemption prem-
iums. This is the figure which is printed or engraved on
the face of the stock certificate or bond; hence the term
face value is considered to be synonymous with par value.
In the case of bonds, par value is usually one
thousand dollars, but for stocks, it may vary from one dollar
or less to one hundred dollars; most often it is the latter
figure. Some stocks are issued without any face value, in
which case they are called "no par" stocks. (2)
10. Legal Investment
This term refers to those securities, the purchase
of which is permitted by the statutes of the various states.
In some states, the law specifies that insurance investments
will be restricted entirely to those of a certain type and/
or quality; others limit the purchase of certain types of
securities to a specified percentage of a given issue or of
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, 0£. clt .
,
pp. 300-301.
(2) David F. Jordan, op>. ci
t
. , pp. 13 and 36.
: C:. - .7 •.
—
~ ( -2 .
r o o r: •
"
-
.
• 1
.
I
<
: XiC
- z)‘_ ' . . 2 .1 . j! *1
- 1 .
: l \) :>:
•
-
:
.
' '
.
•"
.
. ,
•
--
-
, j
.
(2) . 0 0-7 ft 7s i:;
• -J
-
.
•
- O . - --
.
D^Od Q*X - '
-
.
.
. ... t
» • •• . t - ; t
the company’s assets* For a full discussion of this matter,
see Section I G 4*
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C. Statement of Problem
1. Imp or tance of Inves tmen t Income in Successful
Operation of Insurance Companies
There are three major factors in the determination
of life insurance profits which, in turn, affect the net cost
of insurance to the policyholders. Expressed in non- technical
language these are: (1) the death rate among policyholders;
(2) the rate of interest earned on invested funds; (3) the
expenses of operation. The "Gain from Insurance 11 section of
the companies' annual statements designates these items as
(1) mortality savings (2) excess interest, and (3) excess
loading, respectively. Other less important components of
this section of the statements are: (1) gain from surrender
and lapse and (2) miscellaneous gains. The former item
represents the difference between the amount paid to a policy-
holder on default of premium payments and the amount of the
net reserve held against his policy at the time of default.
In setting premium rates allowance is made on the
basis of past experience for the three principal factors
mentioned above. Obviously if the actual experience of the
company after a policy has been sold differs from the situation
assumed when rates were set, a gain or loss occurs, depending
upon the way the "chips” fall. For example, most insurance
companies still base the mortality element of their premium
charges on a table of life expectancy, or mortality table as
it is called, prepared seventy-five years ago, (American
Experience Table) which does not take into account the
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12
improvement of health and the general lengthening of the life
span of human beings since that time, (1) As a result of the
persistent downward trend in the death rate among policyholders
(almost 10% from 1925-1940}, (2) this "mortality" portion of
the insurance cost has been reduced substantially, "Gains from
Mortality" have climbed upward accordingly, (Figures 1 and 2)
In 1944, the Equitable Life Assurance Society reported a mort-
ality gain over and above the expected mortality of
$33,000,000, an amount equal to about 1% of its then outstand-
ing liabilities, (3) Mortality during 1946 among the policy-
holders of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York was
only 53.9$ of the rate provided for. This was the lowest
ratio for any year on record, except for 1925 and 1926, and
the Mutual* a gains from the savings in mortality, were the
greatest for any year in its 104 year history. (4)
As a result of management economies which have been
effected, expenses of operation have been held down and the
ratio of expenses to income, for the life companies as a
whole, has remained fairly constant since 1934, (range of
13.6$-14.2$) In spite of increases in the amount of new in-
surance issued and in services to policyholders.
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, ojo. cit . Page 75.
(2) Life Insurance Fact Book, Institute of Life Insurance,
New York, N. Y. Page 32.
(3) Thomas I. Parkinson, "Low Interest Rates and Public
Welfare." Commercial and Financial Chronicle
,
November 15, 1945.
(4) Wall Street Journal, January 30, 1946.
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In 1945, the ratio was 13*7%, a slight increase over the
1943 and 194 4 figure of 13.6;«. (1) Moreover, between 1942
and the end of 1914 the actual gains from expense in dollars
for the twenty-six companies in the T.N.E.C. analysis took
a sharp rise while the ratio of these to mean admitted
assets of these companies which had maintained an almost
level course for the preceding ten years began to move up-
ward slightly. (See Figures 1 and 2) For example, the
Equitable Life reported a gain of $24,000,000 in the expense
factor in 194 4 over what had been expected and provided for,
and most other large insurance companies enjoyed correspond-
ing gains. (2)
In contrast to the improvements shown in the
mortality and expense elements in the cost of life insurance,
we find that the third principal factor, "Gains from Interest
or "excess interest," has been dropping precipitously since
1930, due to the sharp decline in the net rate earned on the
invested funds. (Figures 1 and 2) Before discussing the
reasons for and effect of the decrease in the interest return
on investments which was a difficulty common to all of the
insurance companies, it is necessary to point out in non-
technical terms why this matter of interest is so vital to
these institutions and their policyholders.
(1) Life Insurance Fact Book, on. ci t
.
Page 33.
(2) Thomas I. Parkinson, on . cit .
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During the sixteen-year period, 1930-1945, income
in the form of dividends and interest for all life companies
in the United States averaged 18.1$ of the total income of
these institutions. Rents received represented another 2.5%,
making the average revenue from all invested, funds 20.6$ of
the total income. (Table 1) More significant, however, is
the fact that income from these sources which was 22.0$ of
the total in 1939 had declined to 18.8$ in 1945. This means
that other income, principally premiums of policyholders,
accounted for approximately 3.2$ more of the companies' in-
come in 1945 than in 1939. In other words, policyholders,
who had to contribute a larger percentage of the insurance
companies' revenues, were the ones who really suffered from
the relative decline in investment income brought about by
the decrease in interest rates.
Table II shows in another way the effect of in-
terest rates on the cost of life insurance. In 1945, the
net investment income of the ten larger companies was almost
$860,000,000. If the net interest rate earned had been 1$
higher than it was in that year, these companies would have
realized additional income from their investments in the
amount of over $278,000,000, or 32.4$ more than they actually
received. Revenue from policyholders could have been cut
down accordingly, either in the form of dividends or smaller
premium payments.
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Now let -us go a step farther in our investigation
and see exactly how and why this matter of investment income
affects the amounts paid by policyholders as premiums. Part
of each premium payment is allocated to what is known as the
policy reserve. The amounts credited to this reserve are
carefully calculated in advance so that, taking into con-
sideration interest which may be earned on the reserve funds
when invested, a sufficient sum will accumulate during the
life of the policies to provide for payment of the face
amount of the policies on maturity or upon the death of the
insured. (1) In estimating the growth of the accumulated
reserves on all policies, each company adopts a specific
rate of interest which it assumes will be earned on the in-
vested funds and added to the reserve. This assumed rate
normally is slightly below the actual current and anticipated
future rate, in order to provide a safety factor or "margin
of safety.”
On December 31, 1945, almost 10% of the policy
reserves for the thirty-eight leading life insurance
companies had been calculated on a 3% or 3\% basis. (2)
(See Table III and Figure 3.) Only eight out of these thir t y-
eight companies had a current reserve basis on all or part of
their outstanding policies of less than 3 %> on that date. Ten
or more years ago when the policies were being written this
(1) Life Insurance Fact 3ook,
_
0£. ci
t
. Page 35.
(2) The Spe eta tor
,
September 1946.
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rate seemed conservative because the general level of
interest then was somewhere between 4% and 5/. Now, due
to the sharp decline in interest rates, the return on
inves tments on the average has been only slightly more, and,
for some companies, has been less than the amounts required
to maintain reserves. As may be seen from Table IV, the
"excess'* interest earnings for the thirty-eight companies
previously referred to dropped from a little over $75,000,000
in 1943 to about $69,000,000 in 1944 and then increased
slightly to $71,000,000 in 1945. The record for individual
companies during this three-year period is quite erratic.
A few, like the Metropolitan, and New England Mutual made
substantially better showings in 1945 than in 1943, but the
majority either just barely held their own or actually lost
considerable ground. In the latter category. Equitable Life
of New York, John Hancock Mutual Life, and Prudential Life,
among the larger companies, show the most drastic declines.
^Decrease
1943 1945 1943-1945
Equitable $10,641,000 $2,133,000 80.0
John Hancock 2,571,000 1,310,000 49.0
Prudential 4,245,000 2,122,000 50.0
Further reference to Table III, page 20, seems to indicate that
the shrinkage in excess interest earnings for the above com-
panies and most others with negative and/or declining figures
may be attributed to the fact that the largest proportion of
their reserves have been calculated at rates in excess of
those which may be earned today on their invested funds.
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In order to get a more detailed picture of how
this matter of interest earnings has affected the financial
position of insurance companies, during the past fifteen
years, a study has been made of John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, The results of this investigation are
portrayed graphically in Figures 4, 5 and Q, Figure 4 shows
the change which has occurred in the percentage composition
of this company's policy reserves. In 1930, all of the
reserves were calculated on a 5\% basis. Then in 1931, it
appears that the Hancock began issuing policies on a 4%
basis also, so that, at the end of 1934, 1,5% of the reserves
had been computed at that rate. As interest rates began to
fall, however, the issuance of 4% policies was stopped, (1934)
surplus funds were allotted to raise the reserves on out-
standing policies to a 5\% basis and premiums on all new
policies being issued were set at a figure which provided
for the accumulation of reserves on a 3% basis. In five years,
1935-1944, this 5% reserve has increased to 28.4% of the total
reserves, while the 5\% reserve has dropped from 99.1% of the
total to 64,5%, In 1938, a 5%% reserve made its appearance
but was eliminated at the end of 1940 when the 2$% policies
first began to be issued; one year later 2% policies appeared
on the scene. At the end .of 1944, the 2% and 2^% reserves
represented only 7,5% of the total but were increasing as more
of the new policies were being issued on these bases.
Figure 5, shows a comparison of interest required
'.
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EXCLUDING A.D.8. AND DISABILITY RESERVES
-- -
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to maintain reserves and net investment income. In 1930,
out of a total net investment income of §25,626,000, about
$17,600,000 was required to maintain the policy reserves,
leaving a balance of about $8,000,000 as a "gain from
interest. 11 Percentagewise
,
the rate in 1930 earned was
4.94 compared with a required rate of 3.35, a difference
of 1.59.
Figure 5, shows further the tremendous growth
in investment income over the succeeding fifteen years, to
a total of $46,575,000 in 1944. However, all except about
$2,200,000 of this figure had to be allocated to the policy
reserves. The increase in interest received resulted from
the expansion of the invested funds represented by the
reserves, even though the net rate of interest earned by
the John Hancock declined until it reached 3.13$ in 1944,
3.00$ in 1945 and 2.96$ in 1946. By 1944, the rate required
to maintain the reserves of this company, which likewise had
declined but to a much smaller degree, stood at 2.98, only
.15 below the rate earned; in 1945 it was 2.93 and in 1946,
2.85.
’When the gain from interest is expressed as a
percentage of the required interest, the resulting figure is
called the "Margin of Safety." This safety factor was 47.6$
for the John Hancock in 1930 and only 5.1$ in 1944. (Figure 6)
This sharp drop which was experienced also by most other in-
surance companies reveals the seriousness of the interest
situation and, unless the rate earned begins to climb, there
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will be no alternative to an increase in premium rates on
the part of all companies to insure that amounts accumulat-
ing in the policy reserves are adequate to meet the pay-
ments due on the policies on maturity.
On the other hand, if a material upswing in the
interest rate earned by companies should take place soon,
increases in the cost of insurance would be unnecessary.
In Table II, computations have been made to show that the
additional income which would have accrued to the ten lead-
ing life companies in 1944 and 1945, if the net interest
rate earned had been 1% higher in each of those years, would
have increased the investment income for the ten companies
by 31.5% in 1944 and 32.4% in 1945. Such additional revenue
would bring the rates of interest earned and interest required
to maintain reserves into a more nearly normal relationship,
forestall any further increase in premiums and make possible
larger dividends to present policyholders. In short, the net
cost of insurance could be cut down.
2. Decreasing Ra te of Interest
Having demonstrated the importance of interest
earnings to insurance companies and their policyholders, we
will turn our attention to an analysis of the nature and
causes of the declining yield on security holdings to which
some reference has been made in the previous section.
Both Figures 7 and 8 depict clearly the trend of
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the yield on corporate bonds. Figure 7 portrays the data on
both long-term and short-term bonds, but it is the former
with which insurance companies are especially concerned.
Since 1932 the curve for 30-year maturities has been sliding
downward, rapidly until 1938 and more gradually since then.
A comparison of yields on the various grades of corporate
bonds for the years 1930, 1935, 1940, 194 5 and 19 46 shown in
Figure 8 confirms the d ownward trend in yields indicated in
the previous chert, reves Is further that there has been a
sharper decline in yield on the MB !t grade securities than in
those with an rating, and indicates a slight improvement
in yield on all except ’’AH" bonds in 1946. Superimposed in
red on Figure 8 is a line shewing the average return on
investments of 1 if e insurance companies in the four key years.
From a study of this red line, it appears that, in 1930 and
1935, insurance companies were earning a rate of interest on
their investment equivalent to the rate on bonds somewhere
in the ,tAl u - ,,A ,f categories; in 1940 the interest earned was
equivalent to the yield on bonds with the ,,A f, - ,, Bl + " ratings;
and in 1945, rates of return on insurance investments were
somewhat below those on MB1+" bonds. In other words, the
yields on corporate bonds has declines more sharply than the
rate of return received on insurance company investments.
This would seem to indicate that the quality of securities in
insurance portfolios had been sacrificed in order to keep the
interest income from sliding off as much as it would have done
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otherwise, snd, ss will be shown later this appears to have
been the case, at least on the part of the larger companies
whose portfolios have been analyzed.
The year-by-year decline in the rate of interest
earned on mean invested fund s of one hundred life insurance
companies appears in graphic form in Figure 9. This chart,
which confirms data on the John Hancock and other companies
presented in the discussion of the declining trend in "excess
interest and the "Margin of Safety," indicates a drop from
5.3$ in 1930 to 3.4$ in 1945, or about 36$. A report issued
by the Institute of Life Insurance states that the rate
earned for 1945 was 5.07$, an even lower percentage than
that given in Figure 9, and that the 1945 earning rate was
one-fourth less than the average of 4.10$ for the decade,
1930-1939. (1)
There appear to be several factors involved in
this decline, namely, the fiscal policy of the 'United States
Government, terrific competition for the limited number of
security offerings, the great influx of capital seeking
refuge in the United States because of disturbed conditions
abroad in the 30' s and the growth in the quantity of money
relative to the gross national product.
It is generally conceded that interest rates depend
(1) Life Insurance Fact Book , op . cit . Page 41.
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to a great extent on the policies of the Federal Reserve Bank
and the United States Treasury. (1) Consequently it is very
significant th8t, during the past year end a half, the
dominant objective of the Treasury Department seems to have
been to keep interest costs at a minimum. On April 2, 1946,
Secretary of the Treasury Vinson, in his annual report to
Congress, flatly reiterated that it was his intention to
continue the wartime policy of low interest rates, and went
on to say that.
This policy will make an important con-
tribution to the achievement of full-
production in the economy, especially
after the backlog of urgent construction
projects piled up by the war has been
satisfied. (2)
Around the middle of 1946, hopes of insurance
companies and other large institutional investors were high
that the government would lend a considerate and attentive
ear to their pleas for the refunding of a big volume of short-
term obligations v/ith a long-term issue. One of the
arguments advanced by the insurance companies was that a new
long-term issue would take from the banks some of the short-
term government securities which are deemed infla tionaryr .
It was contended also by experienced financial men that "non-
bank investors could end would absorb additional Government
(1) F. L. Simmons, "The Outlook for Interest Kates "
May 10, 1946, Guaranty Trust Company, New York
(2) Bos ton Herald , April 3, 1946, Page 25.
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long-term securities et the rate of four or five billion
dollars per year, even under conditions that would prevent
them from selling existing holdings to banks.” (1) How-
ever, both John W. Snyder who succeeded Mr. Vinson as
Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Eccles, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board have fought doggedly against the
issuance of any more long-term Government bonds on the basis
that large financial institutions now have ’’plentiful invest-
ment opportunities” and that the market probably could not
absorb additional long-term Governments at present prices. (2)
To date their will appears to have prevailed so that the
long-rumored refunding of short-term obligations of the
United States seems to have faded out of the picture, at least
for the time being. As long as the Government's current
fiscal policy is maintained, investment men generally agree
that any important rise in long-term rates is highly improbable.
(5)
In passing, attention is called to the fact that
this ”easy money” policy of our Government has had a double-
barrelled effect on investment income of insurance companies.
(1) J. H. Riddle, Interes t Rates and rederal Reserve Policy .
Bankers Trust Company, New York, 1946. Page 9.
(2) Bos ton Herald , September 25, 1946
Barrons Weekly
,
October 28, 1946
(3) Edson B. Smith, Boston Herald , August 13, 1946 and J. H.
Riddle, Debt Management and Interes t Ra tes
,
op . cit. Page 3
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Not only was the yield low on the twenty and one half billion
dollars of Governments held by insurance companies at the end
of 1945, (50$ of total assets) but rates on the twelve billion
dollars of high-grade corporate securities in their portfolios
had been forced down to a level only slightly above that for
the Government issues.
A second factor in the decline of interest rates
has been the excessive competition for the limited amount of
security offerings available. In contrast to the smaller
volume of new issues, the funds of insurance companies and
other large investors seeking productive outlets, as we shall
see later, have been increasing by leaps and bounds. The
result has been the active working out of the law of supply
and demand- the bidding up of prices, ie., a lower yield, on
the securities appearing on the market. In February 1946,
the Madison (Wisconsin) Gas and Electric Company received
sixteen bids for its proposed issue of $4, 500,000 first
mortgage bonds, fifteen of which were for 2hs at a premium.
The winning bid was 101.56, an unheard-of rate, up to that
time, for 30-yeer bonds, and the bonds were reoffered to the
public at a slightly less than a 2.40 basis. (1) at the seme
time the Union Pacifid Railroad swarded $44,493,000 of 30-
year, 2-7/8$ debentures to an investment banking group on a
bid of 107.789, a net interest cost to the road of 2.51$, the
lowest in American railroad history. (2)
(1) Edson B. Smith, "The Investor, Boston Herald , Feb. 7, 1946.
(2) Boston Herald, February 7, 1946
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The reoffering price represented a yield of 2.47% to
maturity. Encouraged by its success in floating those
debentures, the Union Pacific brought out, a little over a
month later, an issue of $81,602,000, 2k% bonds at a net
cost to the road of 2.453/0. (1) No matter what the price,
it seems that investers have been standing around ready to
gobble up every dollar of high-grade securities offered.
Among the competitors for the new issues, we find
that commercial banks became increasingly active, especially
during 1946. Relatively long-term bonds anc notes that were
formerly of no interest to them have been taken at prices too
low to be attractive to insurance companies. In March 1946,
for example, out of a total of $15,000,000 bonds of
Hackensack Water Co. $14,000,000 were sold to commercial
banks. The following month. Automatic Electric Company re-
funded its 4s of 1953 and its 3s of 1947 with the proceeds
of $8,000,000, 7-year unsecured 2% notes sold to the First
National Bank of BostonI An analysis of the March 31, 1946
condition statements of the twenty largest New York banks
showed that total loans had increased fifty percent over the
same date in 1945. Inasmuch as the amount of government
bonds held by these banks was about the same on the two dates.
(1) Bos ton Herald
,
March 14, 1946
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it appears that most of the increase could he attributed to
the policy of substituting bank loans for funded debt referred
to on previous page, (1)
More will be said later about the "demand 11 side of
the interest rate equation; but now a few words further re-
garding the "supply" factor are in order. In the first place.
World War II, curtailed sharply the construction of new plants
and the expansion of existing ones, except those doing work
connected with national defense, so that funds were not needed
to finance such undertakings. In the second place, many in-
dustries which have carried out construction programs before,
during and since the war have been able to finance these ex-
tensions out of their own earnings and revenues and did not
have to seek outside capital, A fine example of this is
found in the electric utility industry in the United States,
During the period 1937-1944, the net plant account of all
electric utilities in this country increased $900,000,000,
while the amount of securities outstanding on the books of
these companies decreased $600,000,000, an indication that
at least one and one-half billion had been taken out of
amounts retained out of the companies' revenues either in
the form of accruals for depreciation and amortization or as
(1) Eds on 3, Smith, "The Investor," Bos ton Herald
,
April 10, 1946.
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surplus esmings remaining after payment of dividends on-
preferred and common stocks. (1) That the one and one-
half billion dollar figure is conservative is indicated by
the fact that gross property additions during 1937-1944
totaled approximately |2, 800,000. (2) If this amount had
not been on hand in the companies 1 pockets, a sizable
addition would have been made to the security issues floated.
without question, part of decline in interest
rates can be attributed to the "ferocious" refinancing en-
couraged and abetted by the investment banking interests and
even by some of the more eager insurance companies them-
selves. After interest rates had made their 'first decline,
investment houses began to promote aggressively the idea of
refunding outstanding securities with those bearing lower
interest coupons. Even though a high call price had to be
paid to the holders of the old bonds it was pointed out that
most, if not all of that, would be absorbed by the excess
profits tax. Some issues, as a result, have been refunded
two, three and even four times in as many years. Northern Nat-
ural Gas Ronds, sold originally on a 4-3/4$ ba sis were refinanced
(1) "The Financia l record of the Ele ctric Utility Indus try ,
1937 - 1944 " Page 5 & 6. F. P. C. Washington, D. C.
November 15, 1945.
Ibid. Pages 5 and 6.(2)
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at 4
-%%, then at 3t/£ and finally, in the latter part of 1945,
on a basis I (1) Similarly the 5%' bonds of the Public
Service Company of Oklahoma, bought originally for long-term
investment by the Equitable at around 90, were refunded as
4s, than as 3§;s and eventually as 2-3/4s
. (2)
Coming back again to the matter of demand for
investment outlets, mention must be made of three other
influences which have affected interest rates adversely,
especially during the war years. One is the great influx of
foreign capital seeking refuge in the United States because
of disturbed conditions abroad. (3) Correlative with this
is, or course, the curtailment of American investments in
foreign countries. New that the war is over this situation
presumably will correct itself, at least in part, with the
withdrawal of f oreign-owned capital, so that competition for
the limited investment offerings may be somev/hat lessened.
The second point concerns the growth in the
quantity of money relative to the gross national product.
The following quotation from an article by Haskell P. Wald
in Survey of Current Susi nes s for May 1946 sums up the
saliend ideas on this matter:
(1) Thomas I. Parkins on, ”Low Interest Rates and Public
Welfare.
1
' The Commercial and Financis 1 Chronicle t
November 15, 1945.
(2) Loc . clt.
(3) Elbert S. Brigham, ^Investing for Security of Home
and Nation.” National Life Insurance Co., 1942.
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Over any extended time period a sizable
’ growth in the quantity of money relative
to the gross national product will tend
to be reflected in increased availability
of funds for investment. Competition for
investment outlets will then result in a
lowering of interest rates, unless there
are simultaneous increases in the demand
for borrowed funds which have counter-
balancing effects. (1)
Just what are the facts in the case? In 1929 the
money supply of the country, (ie. total of currency in cir-
culation and deposits) was $>55,000,000. By 1932 or 1933
this figure had dropped in the great ’’deflation'
1
to
$42,000,000. Early in 1946 it was $180,000,000,000-almos
t
4^5- times as much as at the low point in the thirties. (2)
Without the counterbalancing influence of an increased demand,
mentioned above by Mr. Walo, the ’’price” obtainable for this
extraordinary supply of money sank lower and lower.
The third and final factor which has a definite
relation to and is an outgrowth of the increased money
supoly, is the expansion in various forms of savings-deposits
in mutual savings banks, time deposits in commercial banks
and life insurance in force. In Table V, on the following
page are given data regarding these selected sources of invest-
ment funds for the years 1930-1945, each figure representing
the annual change in each category in billions of dollars.
(1) Haskell P. Wald, ’’The Expanded Money Supply and Economic
Activity, ”Survey of Current Business , May 1946
.
(2) Eds on B. Smi th , "The InvestorT
71 Bos ton Herald
,
April 5, 1946.
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As can be seen from the last column of the preceding table,
there waa an annual increase in the total of these three
sources of investment funds for every year since 1933-fur ther
evidence of the overweighting of the supply of investment
funds, which, as we have seen has been driving down interest
rates.
Further consideration and discussion of the in-
crease in savings and time deposits is beyond the scope of
this paper but the upbuilding of the assets of life insurance
companies which, in turn, creates a rising volume of funds to
be invested by these institutions, may be classified as the
second major problem of insurance companies during the past
fifteen years. Although this problem is akin to and involved
in the first one (declining interest rates) it is distinctive
and important enough to require separate and more detailed
comment at this point.
3. Increasing Amount of Lif e Insurance Fund
s
Seeking Inves tment
,
’The acorn grew and became an oak, but the oak is
still growing.” (1) At the end of 1945 total life insurance
in force reached $155,722,778,000 represented by 166,329,000
policies, compared with $107,948,278,000 and 128,132,000
policies in 1930-an increase of over 46^ and of almost 30%,
respectively. (2)
(1) "Distribution of Life Insurance Assets,” Specta tor ,
September 1946
(2) Spectator Year Book
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Gains in insurance business were even more spectacular in
in 1946. For the first four months of that year life insurance
purchases increased 43$ over the same 1945 period, (1) for
the first six months sales were up 47$; (2) for the first
ten months a gain of 54$ was registered; (3) and for the
entire year 1946, sales jumped 47$ over the previous
year. (4) Consequently, on December 31, 1946, total life
insurance in force in the United States stood at the fantastic
figure of approximately $174,000,000,000', an increase of 10.3$
over the former 1945 high (5) and almost double the
depression low of $87,945,000,000 in 1933.
Figure 10 shows the year-by-year growth in life insurance in
force in the United States from 1930-1946 inclusive, by the
three principal categories, ordinary, industrial and group.
The obvious result of this tremendous increase in
insurance is a similar expansion in the assets of the in-
surance companies. From Table VI and Figure 11, it can be
seen that the total assets of the United States life com-
panies which were approximately $18,880,000,000 in 1930 jumped
$25,917,000,000, or 137$, in the following fifteen years to a
(1) Bos ton Herald, May 22, 1946
(2) Na tlonal Underwriter , July 19, 1946, Page 1.
(3) Weekly Und erwrlter , November 23, 1940, Page 1258.
(4) Dave E. Satterfield, Life Insurance Achievement 1946 ,
Life Insurance Association of America, New York 1946,
Page 2.
(5) Life Insurance News Da ta , December 29, 1946, published
by Institute of Life Insurance.
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(l^£L£ JZE.)
Assets of L . S. Life In.-urance (Companies
1896-1945
1896 $1,243,561,111 1921 $ 7,936,496,844
1 W‘*7
.
1,344,903,198 192* 8,652,318,490
1898 1,462,651,318 19-23. 9,454,620,793
1899. 1,595,208,408 19-24. 10,394,034,380
1900 1,742,414,173 19*5. 11,537,614,609
1901
.
1,910,784,985 19*6 12,939,806,809
190* 2,091,822,851 1927 14,391,850,583
1903. 2,265,221,193 19*8 15,961,093,741
1904. 2,499,060,998 1929. 17,482,308,607
1905. 2,706,180,867 1930 18,879,611,097
1906 2,9*4,253,848 1931 20,159,939,830
1907. 3,052,732.353 1932 *0,754,112,108
1908. 3,380,294,090 1933 20,895,726,259
1909. 3,643,857,971 1934 *1,843,793,869
1910. 3,875,877,059 1935 *3,216,495,614
1911. 4,164,491,688 1936. *4,874,316,359
191*. 4,409,292,521 1937. 26,249,049,219
1913. 4,658,696,337 1938. 27,754,060.541
1914. 4,935,252,703 1939. 29,243,411,498
1915. 5,190,310,353 1940 30,802,154,598
1916. 5,536,607,483 1941 32,730,965,100
1917. 5,940,622,780 194*. 34,931,411,348
1918. 6,475,139,50* 1943 37,766,395,509
1919. 6,790,582,415 1944 41,053,973,888
19*0 7,319,997,018 1945. 44,797,041,217
Sourer: Spectator Year liook.
(Ft 'Ki i i )
total assets - u s l insurance gcmr&mes
1895- 1945
SiLl 0*S
C* X-. -»s
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total of |44,797,000,000 in 1945. Inasmuch as 87.4$ (1)
of this amount was represented by some type of investment,
something of the magnitude of the investment problem of in-
surance companies can be seen.
As a matter of fact, American life insurance com-
panies are the world » s largest investors. (2) They hold
a little more than one-half of the private long-term debt
of the country today, compared to about one-fifth in
1930. (3) In one month alone in 1946 (July) they bought
|)852,000,000 worth of Investments to push the grand total
to a record of $41.7 billion. (4) Of the twenty- three
vice presidents of the largest insurance company in America,
(Metropolitan) six are responsible, for supervising the vast
and complex inves tments -another indication of the relative
importance of this aspect of the business
l
However, it has been not only a matter of invest-
ing the new funds which have been pouring into the insurance
companies, but a struggle to keep the original funds
profitably invested in the face of the ferocious refinancing
to which reference has been made previously in connection
with the discussion of declining interest rates. See Page 40.
(1) Life Inauranc e Fact Book, op . cit. Page 42.
(2) Investor^ Reader , October 4, 1946, Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, New York, New York. Page 1.
(3) H. S. Payson Rowe, Address given before general
agency leaders of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company, September 16, 1946.
( 4 ) Ibid
.
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A study of* the six larger life insurance companies, the
results of which are shown in Table VII, indicates that,
in 1930, there was a ne t increase in the holdings of
stocks and bonds equivalent to 71,3$ of the total
acquisitions of such securities; in 1940 and in 1945,
the percentages were 34.1 and 34.8 respectively. In other
words, only 28.7$ of the bond snd stock purchases in 1930
were required to offset the dispositions (calls, redemptions
8nd sales,) whereas 65.9$ and 65.2$ of the investment effort
in 1940 and 1945 respectively was expended in replacing
securities disposed of for one reason or another. During
1946, a report compiled by the New York Trust Company in-
dicates, 57$ of all security offerings were for the purpose
of refunding outstanding issues. (1)
4. Limitations Imp os ed by Sta te Laws Specifying
'lLegain Investments .
One final problem faced by the insurance companies
is the matter of the restrictions imposed by most states on
the type of investments which may be made by these
institutions. Early in the 20th century the famous Armstrong
investigation began its intensive inquiry into the character
of insurance investments. This was the first public check
on insurance portfolios. Prior to that time, the companies
were free to finance all types of undertakings and enter-
prises, some of which turned out to be unsound and highly
(1) A Compendum of Me j or Corporate Flnanc lng for the
Year 1946, Table II, New York Trust Co., N. Y.
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PERCENT OF NET INCREASE IM BONDS £ STOCKS ACQUIRED
TO TOTAL BONDS & STOCKS ACQUIRED
Six Large Life Insurance Companies - 193Q> 19^0j 19U5
TABLE VII
1930 19U0 191*5
Metropolitan 75.0 U3.9 36.0
Prudential 71.8 Uh. 7 53.3
Equitable 63.1 5.6 22.7
New York Life 70.7 1*9.6 26.2
Northwestern Mutual 63.0 60.2
John Hancock 57.u 61**5 35.5
Total 6 Companies 71.3 3U.1 3U.8
Source: Annual Statements of Companies shown above
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speculative. As a result of this investigation, regulations,
specifying the acceptable or legal types of insurance invest-
ments, were imposed which have changed drastically the
character of the life insurance portfolios.
One of the current limitations which grew out of
the Armstrong investigation is the restriction on the
purchase of stocks
,
particularly common stocks, which, at
one time, were an important source of investment for life
insurance funds. In some states, purchases of common stocks
are prohibited; in others thejr are limited to a small
percentage of the total issue of a company and/or to a per-
centage of the insurance company’s assets; in others the
investment in certain types of stocks which are considered
speculative or which are liable to assessment, is prohibited.
For example, the Massachusetts statute provides that an in-
surance company may not acquire or hold more than 10% of the
total stock (common and prefered) of any company and may not
invest more than 10% of its own assets in a single enterprise;
Wisconsin lav/ likewise limits investment in any one corporation
to 10% on insurance company’s assets; Connecticut statutes
forbid investment in stocks of mining companies; Idaho bans
purchase of stock in oil or canning companies; and hew York,
which since 1906 had allowed no investments in common stocks
by Insurance companies, amended its regulations in 1928 to
permit investment In preferred and guaranteed stocks of
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corporations under certain conditions. (1)
The original recommendation of the Armstrong
Committee forbidding entirely the inclusion of stocks in
insurance portfolios was based on the arguments that, if an
insurance company owned only a fractional part of the
common stock of a corporation, it was at the mercy of the
other stockholders; on the other hand, if its stock invest-
ment was large there would be a temptation and/or tendency
to gain control of the other enterprise, a situation which
would lead the insurance company into operations far afield
from those for which it was chartered. Today the generally
accepted view seems to be that expressed by Mr. Joseph ha clean:
The investment of a considerable propor-
tion of the funds of a life insurance
company in stocks would be unsuitable,
but it is not necessary to prohibit
such investments altogether. Life in-
surance companies are large investors,
and can therefore afford to take a
certain amount of risk, in return for a
higher yield, on some part of their in-
vestments.. (2)
More will be said later on this subject when the
portfolios of companies are analyzed and policies of certain
institutions are discussed.
Another legal restriction, common to most states,
is that which bars Investment in real estate except that
necessary for the conduct of its business or the enforce-
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, op. cl t. Page 273.
(2) Loc. Cit.
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ment of its legal rights under foreclosure provisions of
its mortgage loans. (1) In general, property acquired
by foreclosure, must be disposed of within a certain
limited time unless an extension is granted by the in-
surance commissioners to prevent unnecessary loss.
Presumably these limitations were imposed to stress the
advantages of mortgage loans where the mortagee has a
senior position to the owner of the property whose equity
mus t be wiped out before the mortgagee takes a loss. (2)
In recent years there has been a tendency toward liberal-
ization of laws regarding the holding of income-producing
real estate. These developments will be discussed more
fully in the section dealing with changes and trends in
investment policies of the life companies.
Typical of the restrictions on mortgage loans
are the statutory provisions of New York which limit any
one mortgage loan to 2% of total assets, and those of
Louisiana where not more than B0>& of assets may be invested
in mortgages. (3) The most common statutory regulation
regarding mortgage loans is th at the loan will not exceed
(1) Joseph 'i • Maclean, op. cit
.
Page 268.
(2) Ibid. Page 269.
(3) Ibid". Page 277.
/ s.
•
,
.
.
.
>
•£ " •
_
o ' ‘I “ ' -•
.
iy+
,
. -o’
,
'
, .
<•
.
. . ,
O' \ -
» .
'
.
54
50% of the value of the property; New York specifies
66 -2/5%; while one state goes as low as 40% of value* (1)
As mentioned by Mr* Joseph Macleans
These and similar laws will, however,
be small protection to companies which
do not exercise a constant and forward-
looking supervision of their investments.
Possibly the best type of regulation is that which
specifies a restricted list of investments for a certain
proportion of the funds, leaving the balance to be invested
at the discretion of the company in securities not on the
specified list which appear particularly attractive. The
Massachusetts Law includes such a provision which re-
quires three-fourths of the policy reserves of any domes tic
stock or mutual life company to be invested in securities meet-
ing the requirements of Section 65, Chapter 175, ie.. United
States and Canadian Government bonds, municipal securities of
the United States and Canada which meet certain requirements,
high-grade railroad bonds (as defined in the statute,) bonds
of operating electrical utilities in the United States, those
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, first mortgage
bonds of that company's operating subsidiaries, mortgage loans,
policy loans and industrial liens and Home Office and certain
other real estate. All other investments, including mortgage
bonds of telpehone companies, other than those mentioned above.
United States and Canadian water and gas companies and
(1) Ibid* Page 277
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Canadian light and power utilities are classified as "not
legal."
At first glance these requirements do not seem
to be too stringent. The 25% for "non-legal " investments
would seem reasonable and ample. However, figures compiled
by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, the fifth
largest insurance company in the country, which are given in
Tables VIII and IX reveal how difficult, perhaps impossible,
it is going to be for most companies to fulfill the require-
ments of the law and still obtain a reasonable return on
their invested funds. The John Hancock figures indicate that
"legal" investments of that company amounted to 84.4% of the
Policy Reserve on June 30, 1946. This is a decrease of 4.5%
from December 31, 1945. The decrease is due largely to the
acquisition in recent month. s of a large percentage of "non-
legal" bond and stock investments, but the situation has been
aggravated somewhat by sales and redemptions of "legal"
securities. (1) Of total bonds and stocks acquired in 1945,
but excluding U.S. Governments, only 50.1% were "legal" invest-
ments; for the first six months of 1946 that percentage had
shrunk to a mere 11% l (2) The security disposals in the first
six months of 1946 were 54% "legal" end 46% "non-legal."
Two other calculations which have been made,
emphasize how critical this aspect of the investment situation
(1) Robert D. Patterson, Per centage of "Legal" Inves tinents
to Policy Reserves, March 21, 1946 and November 14, 1946.
(2) Loc. Cit.
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LEGAL AND NOT LEGAL INVESTMENTS
OF JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
June 30, 191*6
TABLE VIII INVESTMENT VALUE
(000 Omitted)
INVESTMENTS LEGAL NOT LEGAL
Government Bonds
United States 699,637 $ -
Canada 33,596 —
Total Governments 733,233 —
States Territories & Possessions Bonds
United States U,32l* 1,053
Canada ll*,i*56 —
Total States 18,780 1,053
Political Sub. of States etc. Bonds
United States to, 719 12,595
Canada 358
"12,595Total Political Subdivisions Ui,077
Railroad Bonds 1*7,325 78,391
Public Utility Bonds
United States 226,81*0 262,021
Canada — 1*1,961*
Total Public Utilities 226
,
81*0 303,985
Miscellaneous Bonds
United States — 95,186
Canada — 15,231
Total Miscellaneous — 110,1*17
Stocks — 60,250
Total Legal or Not Legal Bonds and Stocks
1,070,255 566,691
$ to Total Bonds and Stocks (65.38$) (3U.62?)
Mortgages (Including Foresclosed Liens) 151,712 —
Policy Loans and Industrial Liens 59,537 —
Home Office and other Real Estate 17,759 71*
Total all Investments $1,299,263 $566,765
Policy Reserve June 30, 191*6 $1,538,382
$ of Not Legal Investments to Policy Reserve 36.83$
$ of Legal Investments to Policy Reserve 81*.i*3$
Source : Percentage of "Legal” Investments to Policy Reserves
,
Robert D. Patterson, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company.
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BREAKDOWN OF “LEGAL” AND “NON LEGAL"
BONDS AND STOCKS ACQUIRED JANUARY 1 - JUNE 30, 19U6
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
TABLE IX
LEGAL NON LEGAL
-
-(000 Omitted)- - - -
Government Bonds
United States $50,102 $
States Territories & Possessions Bonds
Canada 227 —
Political Sub. of States etc. Bonds
United States — 768
Railroad Bonds 7,102 22,793
Public Utility Bonds
United States 7,259 1L,2L7
Canada — 32,127
Total Public Utilities 7,259 kb, 37k
Miscellaneous
United States — 23,208
Canada — 11*097
Total Miscellaneous — 3L,305
Stocks —
—
16,358
Total Legal or Non Legal Bonds
and Stocks 465,000 $120,598
% to Total Bonds and Stocks (35*) (65$)
Total Investments Acquired
(Stocks and Bonds) $185 ,£98
<
;
- I
201
*
0 ;.
3jb;io .. :3 eo\ ' • cel.Yl
— TS2
•,
.
.
-
-- i
•; j. J J ss.
07tY-:S s.:...*
"
„
-
,jiC'iU:s.'i
t
"v;*
'
.
'
ix‘
cl. -VI
:i jj . c. V
a .a: : J
- tC-
.
. ;
.
- -
s o;..g.Vjob ' .
.
. j .
c... 3 -
clooV
,
-• -
e oo 2
r.
; oo; . j . ib . 3fi: Ifii. Ou ";
oA 3iCLStsSB9VBX XbJ'oT
*
58
has become for* the largest life insurance company in
Massachusetts. First, computations indicate that approx-
imately 59.7%, or sixty cents out of every dollar of in-
crease in admitted assets must be of "legal” classification
in order to provide the 75% rstio of legal investments to
Policy Reserves. (1) As mentioned in the preceding para-
graph the percentage for 1945, excluding U. S. Government
Bonds, was just about one -ha If of the required figure
(30.1%) and, for the first six months of 1946 only a little
less than one-fifth (11%) of the sixty, cents required:
Secondly, the margin of safety of 9.4$ is equivalent to
only $145,100,000 so that the sale of $150,000,000 worth
of John Hancock’s holdings of United States Government
Bonds would drop that company below the 7 5% requirement.
Recommendations for alleviating this situation will be
discussed later in this paper.
The object of the various investment regulations
of the states which have been considered thus far has been
either to insure soundness and prevent speculation or to
eliminate improper practices, such as the control of bus-
iness enterprises foreign to the insurance field. (2) Both
of these motives may be considered commendable or at least
(1) Robert L. Patterson, op . ci
t
.
(2) Joseph B. Maclean, op . cl t. Page 275.
.*
_
.
.
'
*
.
,
. > • «
.
_
.
•1r 9. G too '>& ’ o 2
,
^ ?
.
legitime te. However, there is a third type of state
regulation, the aim of which definitely is unreasonable
and unfair. Such statutes seek to direct insurance funds
into investments favored and supported by state legislative
bodies. The outstanding example of regulation of this
kind is the Robertson Law of Texas, which requires that
three-fourths of the reserves on policies on lives of
Texas residents shall be invested in specified securities
of that state. (1) As a result of this law, many large
insurance companies ceased writing policies in Texas, not
because they couldn't find suitable investments there which
would satisfy the law but because they didn’t wish to sub-
mit to such arbitrary and dictatorial control of their
investment portfolios. It is generally agreed t'-fit the
Texas securities (and those of any other locality) which
are suitable for investment will be sought out by the
insurance companies; those which are not desirable should
not be forced into their portfolios by politically-conscious
legislators who may be completely unfamiliar with sound
investment practice. (2)
(1) Ibid. Page 275.
(2) Ibid. Page 276. •
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D. Review of Work Done by Others
a.
1. Books in Public Libraries
A survey of the archives of one of this country’s
outstanding public libraries brought to light an aston-
ishing dearth of current literature specifically discussing
the matter of life insurance investments. The information
in the few books available was altogether too obsolete
for this report.
2. More Up-to-Date Volumes in Insurance Libraries
A seerch through the library of the Investment
Department and other departments of the John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company disclosed several volumes on specific
types of investments (municipals, railroads, and public
utilities) and a few on life insurance which included pert-
inent chapters or sections on investments. The most help-
ful of these books included the following from which much
information has been drawn and included in this paper:
Bond Ra t ing s a s An Inves tment Guide
Gilbert Harold-1968
Life Insurance (Sixth Edition)
Joseph B. Maclean-1945
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Best’s Life Reports, (1931, 1936, 1941, 1946)
Alfred M. Best
The Spe c ta tor Ins-gpanc e Yea rb o ok- 1 94
6
Jordan on Inves tments (4th Revised Edition)
David F. Jordan-1941
The Metropolitan Life
Marquis James-1947
3* Newspapers , Perl odloa
I
s
,
Pamphlets and Bulletins
.
Generally speaking, however, there is but little
current information on life insurance investment policies
and trends in books published to date, so that trie most
valuable sources of such data have been newspapers,
periodicals, mis cellaneous pamphlets and occasional bul-
letins in which addresses, opinions and statements of lead-
ing life insurance executives and other inves tment experts
have been reported. A complete listing of this literature
is included in the Bibliography. Inasmuch as the titles of
such documents are quite descriptive and self-explanatory,
no detailed review of them appears necessary at this point.
Appropriate credit to the various sources is given in foot-
notes appearing throughout this report*
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E. he thod of Approach
In developing this thesis, consideration will
be given to the following topics:
(1) Investment standards of life
insurance companies.
(2) Bond ratirgs and their use.
(3) Analysis of investment portfolios of
the larger companies for the last
sixteen years.
(4) Trends in life insurance investments
as indicated by shifts in the
proportion of various types of inves t-
ments and grades of securities in
portfolios of life companies 1930-1946.
(5) Possible and potential developments
in investment policies, practices
and procedures.
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II. Investment Standards and Testa
A. Principal Cons id era tions
1 • Conservatism
The one principle which dominates investment
policies of all life insurance companies is CONSERVATISM,
In some instances, it might even be classified as ULTKA-
conservatisml One insurance executive, in discussing the
operations of his company, explained: "We have two big
functions. One is to sell insurance, the otter is to
protect and increase the policyholders’ money An
insurance policy is a contract that must be kept. We can-
not s pecula te-we have to be conservative." (1) Three words
seem to stand out in the above quotation, "protect and in-
crease." It is not a question cf "either ... or" but of
"both. . .and" • If the insurance companies were charged only
with the responsibility of protecting tteir policyholders’
money, that would be a relatively simple matter- jus t place
it in some secure and heavily guarded vault and let it stand
until the policy matures. On the other hand, if investment
officers had to think only of trying to increase to the
maximum extent the funds entrusted to them by policyholders-
and were not concerned or held accountable if losses occurred
as a result of participation in certain speculative ventures
(1) Investors ’ Reader, October 4, 1946. Page 1
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which would have provided an excellent return if they
had succeeded instead of fsiled-they would find it much
easier to select outlets and uses for their investment
monies. However, to protect and increase funds requires
the ultimate in sound judgment, and unusual business acumen.
2. Security of Principa l
Just what ere the general requirements for a
good investment from the point of view of a life insurance
company. First and foremost is the element of security
of principal. Now this is not measured solely by the pro-
tection or adequacy of a mortgage lien, although to be
sure, the highe s t-grade investments and those demanding
the highest prices, are generally considered to be those
secured by a mortgage on a sufficient amount of fixed
property to insure that the face value of the bonds is
p8id in the event that company issuing the bonds defaults
on any terms or conditions of the loan so that the bond-
holder has to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property.
Insurance companies are not interested in taking over
control of a business; in fact the laws of most states
prohibit them from doing so. Therefore, in measuring or
determining the security of their principal, these
institutions consider the ability of a company to meet its
obligations, principal and interest payments, year by year.
-.
'J .
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in depression periods as well as during prosperity. (1)
Their analyses are directed toward determining whether
fixed charges, including interest on all debt to be out-
standing and sinking fund payments have been covered by
an ample margin in the years past, and whether the future
earning of the prospective borrower will be sufficient
during the life of the loan to pay these established
annual expenses.
One factor of security which is sometimes over-
looked or disregarded is the call price or redemption
price of bonds and stocks. Generally speaking, an in-
surance company will not pay more for any security than
it will get back in the event that the issuing company
decides to pay off its indebtedness. (2) The terms of
most bond and preferred stock issues provide that they
may be redeemed at any time at the option of the company
upon payment of a specified premium intended to compensate
the security holder for the loss of interest he had expect-
ed to collect over the original life of the issue and the
expense of reinvesting his funds. Obviously if an investor
pays more for a bond (or stock) than he would receive if
(1) H. S. Pays on Rowe, "Safety Tests for Bond Investments"
Trus t Companie s Magazine
,
December 1936.
(2) David Durand, Basic Yield s of Corpora te B ond s 1900-1942
Technical Paper 3, National Bureau of Economic Research,
New York, 1942.
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the bond should be called or redeemed and paid before
the excess of the purchase price over the call price had
been amortized or charged off on the books of account,
he would lose a portion of the original funds he had in-
vested. Consequently, insurance companies steer clear of
any bond or stock which would cost more than the current
call price because the security of their principal would
be jeopardized.
3. Reasonable Yield
The second fundamental consideration of invest-
ment departments of life companies, quite naturally, is a
reasonable yield or return in income on their Investment.
As has been pointed out earlier, all insurance premiums
are calculated on the assumption that a certain specified
rate of interest will be earned on that portion of the
premiums which are set aside in the Policy Reserve for pay-
ment of policies on maturity. Hence, an insurance company
cannot allow its funds to lie around idle but must put them
to productive use so that they will grow at a rate sufficient
to maintain the reserves. As one writer puts it, ”It is the
duty of the company to choose its investments in such a way
as to secure the highest yield consistent with safety, in
order that it may furnish insurance to its policyholders
at 1 ow c os t • " ( 1
)
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, op. cl t
.
Page 266.
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In considering both security and yield, it
should be pointed out tha t because of the volume and wide
scope of a company’s investments, some losses are inevit-
able over the years, However, by applying to investments
the same principles of averages used in insurance, it is
possible and feasible to set up a contingency or invest-
ment-fluctuation fund out of the profit on disposition of
securities and out of the higher interest earnings on the
less well-secured holdings. From this reserve any losses
incurred on their investments may be made good. Thus it
becomes possible for an insurance company to adopt a
reasonably liberal investment policy-and this does not
mean specula tion-which would justify purchase of some
securities not considered desirable or appropriate for
an individual. (1)
4 • Divers ifica tion
The final important consideration for insurance
investnents is diversification. During recent years when
demand has exceeded supply, this requirement, of necessity,
has been pushed considerably farther into the background
than is normal. Insurance companies, however, do try to
distribute their funds geographically and among different
classes of investments, as well as among as wide a variety
(1) Joseph B. Maclean, ojd. clt
.
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of industries as possible. The reasons for so doing
are fairly obvious. It would be dangerous to concentrate
too large a proportion of the investments in any one
company, locality or industry or in a group of inter-
related and int er-dep endent industries since unfavorable
economic conditions or other unfortunate and unforseen
events (the so-called "Acts of God") might wipe out the
investment and place the insurance company in a precarious
financial position. An accurate idea of how this principle
of diversification has been carried out may be obtained
from Table X which shows the investment figures for foreign
investments as well as those for each section of this
country, in dollars and as a percentage of the total, at
the end of 1941 and 1945. An additional column indicates
the percentage change in investments in the different areas
between these two years.
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B . Spe cific Tes ts
1
.
Municipal Bond s
We cone now to a consideration of the specific
tests which insurance companies apply to the securities
which they are contemplating purchasing.
Although municipal bonds are of relatively little
interest to insurance companies at the present' time because
of the low rate of interest paid, mention will be made of
five standards applied by one insurance company in judg-
/
ing their desirability. (1)
1. Overall debt not over 12% of assessed
of assessed valuation of taxable real
property.
2. Balanced budget for previous year and
current operations on a cash basis.
3. Average tax collection record for
past six years of 90%,
4. Community willing and able to pay.
5. Enforceability of the obligation.
The first three points are self-explanatory but
the last two need to be amplified somewhat. The will of
the community to pay is determined by its debt history.
Have previous bond issues been paid or refunded on maturity?
Have tax rates been increased when necessary to service the
(1) H. S. Payson Rowe, op. ci t. Page 3
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debt? Have the community and its citizens exercised
discretion and intelligence in the operation of municipal
affairs? These are questions which may be asked to deter-
mine whether or not the community is acting in good faith
in issuing the new bonds.
The ability of the municipality to pay may be
judged by several factors-(l) its economic position, which
involves a study of its importance as a trading center and
the nature and diversification of its industry; (2) the
nature of the city management, ie., political or business-
like; (3) budgetary and accounting practices; (4) relation
ship of the community to the state; (5) relationship of
assessed valuation to true value of real estate; (6) out-
standing debt-per capita, distribution of maturities and
adequacy of sinking funds; (7) reasonable operating costs;
and (8) method of handling unemployment relief-covered out
of current funds or met by borrowing. (1)
The enforceability of municipal securities
seems to hinge on whether or not the bonds were duly author
ized by the citizens. This matter has been receiving
particular attention ever 3ince a Texas community (Corpus
Christi) claimed that some of its bonds had been issued
without proper authority and defaulted on their payment a
few years ago. To date no satisfactory settlement has been
(1) H. S. Pays on Rowe, ojo. c it
.
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agreed on by the bondholders and the city and the case Is
still being argued in the courts. Other instances of
invalid and noncollectible municipal bonds have been caused
by one or more of the following deficiencies: (1) pur pose
of issue outside the legitimate objectives for which bonds
may be issued, (2) violation of minute technical require-
ments of the law, or (3) amount of issue in excess of
legal debt limit. (1) So important is the matter of
validity of municipal bonds that even experienced investors
will buy only those bonds which have been approved by one
of the fifty law firms in the country considered qualified
to determine their legality. (2)
2. Public U ti 1 i ty Bonds
Public utility bonds, including those of water,
gas, telephone and electric companies, are measured by an
entirely different set of standards. Although the require-
ments differ for each type of utility the following tests
are the principal ones used as general guides by one of
the larger insurance companies: (3)
1. Ratio of mortgage debt to net value
(gross value less depreciation reserve)
of property
(1) David F. Jordan, Jordan On Inves tmen ts, op . c it. P. 318
(2) Ibid . P. 319
(3) John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.
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less than 65$. In the case of water
companies a ratio of 70$ is not considered
excessive while a percentage of 50$ for
telephone companies and over 60$ in the
case of certain gas and other utilities
might make the loan undesirable.
2. Net earnings, after taxes and an
adequate allowance for depreciation and
maintenance, equal to at least twice the
total interest charges in each of the past
five years. Depreciation and maintenance
charges for telephone companies normally
run from 25$ to 30$ of gross operating
revenues in contrast to an average of
about 15$ for electric and gas utilities
and even lower rates for water companies.
3. At least 20$ of gross revenues should
remain after payment of interest charges
but before payment of taxes.
4. Inasmuch as most bond issues are now
of the open-end type, terms of the indenture
securing the bonds should set a limit on the
amount of bonds that may be issued against
property additions. In only rare instances
(water companies, for example) will a rate
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of additional bonds to new property in
excess of 70$ of cost or fair value of the
additional property be justified, k
figure of 66-2/3$ or even 60$ is considered
preferable •
5. Rates must be reasonable and in line
with those of comparable utilities. Excess-
ive rates indicate that a company is
vulnerable to rate cuts, either as the result
of public agitation or the ruling of state
public utility commissions.
6. k sinking fund which will retire all or
part of the issue by maturity is highly
desirable. In the case of natural gas and
other companies where - the source of supply
is limited, such a sinking fund is essential
and must provide for a complete pay-out of the
bonds by maturity.
7. Funded debt should be less than four
times gross revenues.
8. Funded debt should be less than 60$ of
total capitalization. Capitalization as used
here includes funded debt, capital stock and
surplus
•
9. There should be adequate diversification
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of load between residential, commercial,
industrial and municipal revenues, A
utility with high percentage of its revenues
coming from industrial business which is
subject to the severe cyclical fluctuations
of business conditions is considered in a
much weaker position than one where the bulk
of the revenues come from the more or ofi table
domestic or residential field. On the basis
of total figures for the leading electrical
utilities in the United States, the percentage
of revenues obtained from each source in 1945
was as follows, (1)
Domestic (Residential) 34
.
9%
Distinctly Rural 2.7
Commercial 25.5
Indus trial 30.0
Municipal 2.3
Miscellaneous 4.6
Total 100.0%
Obviously these percentages are only a guide
and many of the stronger companies may have
entirely different ratios due to unusual
factors or circumstances existing in the
communities they serve or because of the
nature of their operation. The main point is,
(1) Moody * s Public Utility Manual , 1946
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however, that any utility with a high
percentage of industrial business should be
carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether
the load will be maintained at the same high
level during depression as well as in prosperity.
10. The company must be protected by franchises
authorizing it to operate in the communities it
serves. These should extend beyond the life
of the bonds or there must be some indication or
assurance, based on past experience and the
actions of the local authorities and public
service commissions, that they will be renewed
or extended upon expiration.
11. Consideration should be given to the
actual or potential competition from other
utilities especially power projects of the
Federal Governmoit. In certain sections of the
West and Southwest, the threat of competition
from government power developments is very real
and must be closely analyzed and watched.
12. The trend of the company’s business, as
indicated by the increase in the number of -
customers and the average number of kilowatt
hours used annually per customer, gives an
,
indication of the managements ability in load
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building. Any decline or a less than normal
increase in these items provides a danger
signal that there maybe something inherently
faulty in the company's territory or operations.
3. Railroad Bonds
Evaluation of railroad bonds is an even more
difficult and complicated matter due in part to the involved
debt structure of most roads. One of the financial officers
of the John Hancock Life Insurance Company feels that "there
is no probability of loss" if railroad investments are
limited to first mortgage bonds on "main line mileage of
a railroad property that has economic justification" for
the indefinite future. (1) Other tests for railroad bonds
outlined by this experienced investor include the following:
1. Ratio of funded debt to total
capitalization not over 50$. Those roads
which have maintained such a ratio have
made the best showings during lean periods.
2. Earnings sufficient to cover all interest
charges in each of the past fifteen years
after adequate allowance for maintenance has
been made.
3. Satisfactory traffic density.
(1) H. S. Payson Rowe, Safety Tes ts for Bond Inves tmen ts ,
op. cit. P. 5 .
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Other points which must be considered and compared with
other Class I roads are: (1)
1. Phys ical factars -location of mileage,
amount of double track, weight of rail,
amount of equipment owned
2. Opera ting s tat is tics -character of
traffic, average haul and rate received,
car mile operating costs, train mile figures.
3. Financial f actcrs -trend of opiating
revenues, average revenue per ton-mile,
nature 8nd amount of other income, ratio
of maintenance charges to gross earnings,
and the relative amount and trend of
transportation expense.
4. Political f a ctor s -lab or costs and
freight rates.
4. Indus tria 1 Bonds
In the industrial field there is such a wide
variation in operating and balance sheet ratios between
companies in different lines of business that the generally
accepted investment standards must be applied carefully with
due consideration being given to peculiar circumstances
which may exist in some industries. The basic tests for
(1) H. S. Payson Rowe, _o£. ci t
.
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Industrial Bonds used by the John Hancock Mutual Life
In sui'- a nee Company are :
!• Ke t inc ome
,
after proper allowances
for depreciation and depletion, shall have
been over four times pro-forma interest
charges in nine out of the last ten years,
2, Working capital (current assets minus
current liabilities) at time of issue of new
bonds equal to total amount of funded debt to
be outstanding. Provision should be made in the
indenture securing the issue for the maintenance
of working capital in the same ratio throughout
the life of the bonds.
5. Ma turi ty preferably not over twenty years.
4. Sinking fund capable of retiring at least
one-half of the issue by maturity.
5. Market value of the e qu i ty (as previously-
defined) at least equivalent to twice the
funded debt to be outstanding.
6. Met value of property plant and equipment
at least twice the pro-forma funded debt.
In addition to the above financial tests, a care-
ful study is made of the reputatjion, efficiency and general
capability of the top executive staff. Reports from credit
agencies, checkups with banks end personal interviews of the
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men themselves are all used in an effort to determine
whether management of the company issuing the securities
is unquestionably sound. Inasmuch as most industrial
earnings are subject to wide fluctuations, as between
periods of prosperity and depression, investments are
preferred in those companies whose managements follow the
policy of paying off indebtedness as rapidly as possible.
Generally speaking, insurance companies will
consider only the securities of large companies with a
record of profitable operations extending back fifteen or
more years. The reason for this is twofold; firstly, only
tiie larger companies are capable of floating the large
issues which are of interest to insurance companies; and,
secondly; the standards of these institutions are so high,
as outlined above, that an industrial concern must have
an impressive and stable sales volume and must be
unusually strong financially to measure up to them.
Companies producing a well-advertised and generally-accepted
product are preferred to those whose merchandise is little-
known. Likewise industries with a large capital investment
in relation to funded debt, such as steel and oil companies,
are looked on more favorably than those whose ratio of
fixed capital to funded debt is relatively low. (1)
Finally, flexibility of output and ability to take advantage
(1) H. S. Payson Rowe, op. cit. P. 6
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of rapidly changing technological and economic conditions
in the industry are construed as indications of the type
of enterprise in -which a life company should invest
i ts fund s
• ( 1
)
5, Preferred Stocks
If the standards for bond investments are
high, preferred stock qualifications are even more
difficult to meet. Here are the financial tests applied
by the John Hancock to preferred stock offerings of
public utilities and industrial concerns:
A. Public Utility
1. Funded debt plus preferred stock
not over 80$ of minimum sound value of
property. In determining this ratio it is
especially important to eliminate from the
property account any appraisal write-ups which
may have been brought on to the books in past
years. This not so difficult now as it was
some years ago inasmuch as most state utilities
commissions have required companies under their
jurisdiction to state the value of their fixed
property at "original cost when first devoted
to the public service."
(1) Loc. cit.
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2.
Income available for fixed charges after
taxes at least one and three-fourths times
total pro-forma interest charges plus pre-
ferred dividend requirements in each of the
last five years and at least one and one-half
times such charges and preferred dividends in
each of the last ten years*
3* Percentage of gross operating revenues
remaining after interest and preferred
dividends but before taxes at least 20%.
B . Indus trial companies
1* Pro-forma preferred and funded debt
requirements covered at least four times
for the last seven-year average, at least
three times for last fifteen-year average,
and at least once in the poorest of the
last fifteen years.
2. Common stock equity at least three times
the funded debt plus preferred stock.
3. Sinking fund to retire 2% of the
issue annually.
4. Restrictions against the creation of
senior issues.
5. Provision for cumulative dividends.
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6 • C omrn on Stocks
Occasionally an insurance company buys an
unusually high-grade common stock of some outstanding and
well-known company. To warrant consideration, the
issuing company must have a conspicuous earnings record
for the past fifteen years, the price-times-eernings
ratio must be reasonable (shout 10 to 15, depending on
the type of company and other factors,) and there must
be adequate asset support for the stock. In connection
with this last item, any common stock which is selling
much above the net value per share of the assets supporting
it will not be given further consideration by most
insurance companies.
All of the general comments regarding the
character, type of business, quality of management, and
so forth of the issuing companies which were made in the
section covering bond tests are of course equally applic-
able to companies whos e preferred and/or common stocks
are being analyzed and studied with an eye to possible
investment therein. No standards have been given for rail-
road stocks inasmuch as the quality of most such securities
is not high enough at present to warrant investment by the
life companies.
Although the investment qualifications for both
bonds and stocks which were given above are largely those
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used by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Comoany
of Boston, Massachusetts, they may be considered comparable
to and typical of those applied by the other large
insurance companies.
7. RQ s 1 Es ta te Mor tgages
Inasmuch as mortgages on farm and city real
estate constituted over \ r6\% of the assets of twenty-two
of the larger insurance companies on December 51, 1945, a
few words regarding the qualifications of such investments
from an institutional point of view are in order. The
basic requirement for both farm and city mortgages is the
determination of property vslue through competent appraisal.
Until about fifteen or twenty years ago,
valuation of farm property were based largely on the cost
price less depreciation, or on prevailing values of
similar properties from the point of view of location,
condition and use. (1) However, as a result of the un-
fortunate experience with farm loans during the early
1930’s, appraisal methods based upon earning power have
been developed for farm property. (2) To determine
earning power, the first step is to apply normal price
averages to the yields for the past several years . Then
(1) David F. Jordan,
_
0£. cit . Pp. 433 and 443
(2) Loc . cit.
.'
‘
: '.v
'
»
•
.
.
•
.
*
d t •r . .
•
'•
.
•’ 2 fi* . -'3
. . . t
.
.
86
other factors such as neighborhoods, roads, schools,
churches, proximity to markets and suitability to
multiple-line farming are given appropriate weight. (1)
In appraising residential city property,
particular attention. is paid to the type and manner of
construction. A well-built home depreciates at the rate
of 2;4 to 2|-/o annually, whereas one which has been cheaply
constructed has an estimated life of only 25 years and a
depreciation rate of 4% annually. The possibility of
declining, or improving value due to neighborhood changes
is also important. (2) In the case of commercial
buildings, earning power is carefully r-omputed and has an
important place in the appraisal just as it does in farms.
In the past, considerable difficulties have arisen because
these estimates of earning power failed to take into con-
sideration such factors as vacancies, carrying charges and
possible rent reductions caused by poor business conditions,
but particular attention is being given now to such
items, (3) Type of construction and adaptability of the
property to different uses are also significant consider-
ations. The traditional view is that a good mortgage
should not exceed two-thirds of the fair market value of
the property, as determined by the appraisal methods
(1) David F. Jordan
(2) Op. clt . P. 444
(3) Loc. Git.
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mentioned on previous page. (1) However, in recent
years the rather valid argument has been advanced that
the margin of safety on home mortgages should vary with
the value of the property. (2) In fact F.H.&. mortgage
have been issued on such a basis: (3)
1. Twenty-five year amortized loans on
homes valued at $6,000 or less, 90$ of
value, maximum of $5400.
2. Twenty-year amortized loans on homes
valued between $6000 and $20,000, 80$ of
value
•
3. Twenty-year amortized loans on apart-
ment buildings and residential sub-divisions,
80$ of value, maximum $4,000,000.
On the other hand long-term mortgage loans on
farms generally should not exceed 50$ of appraised fair
market values in times of prosperity, inasmuch as land
values are subject to declines of a s much as 30$ to 40$
in depression periods. Granting of farm mortgages in
excess of 50$ of value, therefore, would constitute more
of a speculation than a sound investment. (4)
(1) David F. Jordan, op. cit. P. 440.
(2) Ibid, P. 446.
(3) Jordan, 0£. cit
.
P. 439.
(4) Ibid. P. 443
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As can be seen from the previous discussion,
the key to all mortgage lending is the appraisal of the
property. Even by using the "earning power" method,
there appears to be grave danger of over-va lua ti on when,
as at the present time, we are coasting along happily
and serenely at or near a peak in the business cycle.
As a matter of fact, there is considerable anxiety in
some quarters today over the outcome of the mortgage
loans being made on the basis of highly-inf la ted property-
values. In the event that foreclosure becomes necessary,
it is felt that investors, including some insurance
companies, will find it difficult, if not impossible to
liquidate fully their loans.
C. Bond Ratings
i. Use
As a further aid in the evaluation of bonds,
there are available the ratings applied to most public
issues by the Fitch, Moody, and Standard and Poor services.
Since each security is very carefully studied by their
professional investment analysts to determine its quality,
considerable weight and value may be attached to the ratings
given. The grading of bonds in this manner is especially
helpful in making a quick comparison of two or more issues
that appear on the surface to be of about the same quality.
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However, the fact that these ratings are limited to the
time when they are originally determined, are being
revised constantly, and are subject to change without
notice, indicates that they must be used with extreme
caution. (1)
2. Key to Symbols Used
The significance of the various ratings used
by the Moody’s Investors Service is as follows: (2)
Aa_a -Bonds of the best quality which
carry the srrallest degree of investment
risk and which are generally referred to
as l’gilt edge.” Interest payments are pro-
tected by a large or by an exceptionally
stable margin and principal is secure.
While the various protective elements are
likely to change, such changes as can be
visualized are most unlikely to impair the
fund amenta 11 y • s tr ong position of such issues.
Aa-Judged to be of high quality by all
standards and together with the Aaa group
they comprise whe t are generally known as
high-grade bonds. They are rated lower than
(1) David F. Jordan, Jordan on Investments , op . cl t
.
P. 109
(2) Moody’ 3 Bond Record , Deceirber 5, 1941. P. 5.
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the top quality bonds because margins of
protection may not be as large, fluctuation
of protective elements may be of greater
amplitude, or the presence of other elements
makes the long-term risk appear somewhat
greater than in Aaa securities.
A-Bonds which possess many favorable invest-
ment attributes and which are to be considered
as higher medium-grade obligations. Security
of both principal and interest is assured but
factors are present which indicate possible
impairment in the future.
Baa -Cons id ered to be lower medium grade
obligations, ie., neither highly protected
nor poorly secured. Intere s t p ayments and
principal security appear adequate for the
present but certain protective provisions
either may be lacking entirely or may be of
little value at some time in the future. Bonds
with this rating not only lack investment
qualities but possess speculative elements also.
Da -Future of these bonds not well assured because
of presence of speculative elements. There may be
only moderate protection of interest and principal
payments. Uncertainty of position characterizes
bonds of this grade.
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B-Chara cteris tica of a desirable invest-
ment generally are absent. There may be but
small assurance that payments of interest and
principal will be made over a long period of
time. 'The possibility is also present that
other terms of the contract may not be
adhered to in the long run.
Caa -Is sues of poor standing, possibly in
default or with elements of real danger with
respect to interest and principal payments.
Ca_-Highly speculative securities. Often are
those in default or those with other important
deficiencies
.
C-3onds with extremely poor prospects of
attaining any real investment standing.
In order to shew the relationship between the
symbols of the principal rating agencies the following
tabulation is presented: (1)
(1) Gilbert Harold
-
Bond Ra tl ng s as An Inves tment Guide
Ronald Press Company, New York, N. Y. 1938, P. 75.
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Moody Pitch Poor Standard
Majority
In te rpre ta ti on
of Significance
Aaa AAA A*** A14- Highes t
Aa AA A# A1 High
A A A A Sound
Baa BBB B-xst B14. Good
Ba BB B* B1 Fair
B B B B Somewhat Speculative
Caa CGG C-3H5- G1 + Specula tive
Ca CG Cl Highly Speculative
C C G C Extremely Speculative
- DDD D## Dl| Low or Weak
- DD D*x- D1 Small or Very ’Weak
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III
.
Analysis of Investment P ortfolios
A. Maj or Asset Class ifice tions
1. Increases in Various Cla s ses of Ass e ts
Having discussed the ul era -cons erva fcism which
characterizes the investment policies and standards of
life insurance companies, let us now turn our attention to
a study of the composition of the investment portfolios of
these institutions in order to see how these policies have
been translated into action in the investment of approxi-
mately $48, 000, 000, 000- the total admitted assets of all
United States companies at the end of 1946. (1) The break-
down into broad categories of the investments of forty-nine
United States legal reserve companies which held about 90)o
of these assets is shown, for the years 1950, 1935, 1940
and 1945, in Table XI on the following page.
Several definite trends are revealed in the follow-
ing figures. First; the volume of mor tgage inves tments has
declined substantially from almost $7,000,000,000 in 1930 to
about $6,000,000,000 at the end of 1946. The latter figure
however, represents a gain of about $1,000,000,000 over the
low point in 1938. As is well known, the holdings of
government bond s surged unward and the total for the forty-
nine companies studied jumped from a little over $1,000,000,000
in 1930 to over $21,000,000,000 in 1946. During the seventeen-
(1) Satterfield, op . c it
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year period, investments in corpora te b onds and s tocks in-
creased 131.8%; cash , 363.7%; real es ta te owned, 54.3%;
and other admitted assets
,
24*8%. The only class of assets,
other than mortgages, which registered a decline in this
time was the group known as Policy Loans and Premium Notes
which was off 34.7% in 1946 compared with 1930.
2. Relative Imp or tance of Vari ous Asset Groups
In order to get a clearer view of these changes.
Table XII, in which the absolute, or dollar figures, have
been converted into indices representing the percentage of
each of the items to the total admitted assets for each year,
is presented on the following page.
From Table XII, the decline in the relative import-
ance of mortgages is more clearly seen. Although investments
of this type amounted to over 40% of the total admitted
assets in 1930, ranking first in importance, they had cropped
to third place in 1946 when they constituted only 13.7% of
the total assets. Their position at the top of the list was
taken by government b onds’ representing approximately 50% of
all admitted assets at the end of 1946, compared with 7.7%
in 1930. Although Table XI indicated a growth of 131.8% in
holdings of corporate securities during the seventeen-year
period. Table XII on the following page reveals that this
class of investments actually declined somewhat in relative
importance during this time (29.9% of admitted assets in 1930,
27.7% In 1946). Policy Loans and Notes tumbled from 14.5% to
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3.8%, while Real Es ts te and Other Admi tted As sets declined
2.4$ and 4.3$ to 1 . 5$ and 2.1$ respectively. Cash, which
on the basis of the dollar figures increased about 363%,
shows only a growth from 0.7$ to 1.3$ in relative import-
ance. Detailed discussion of these various changes will
be reserved for a later section of this report after
additional figures and some charts have been presented to
throw further light on this kaleidosopic investment scene.
B. Detailed Review of Composition of Portfolios
1. General Comments on Charts and Tables
Figures 12 and 13, and Table A (appendix) not
only show the general changes referred to above but also
furnish breakdowns of the mortgage, government bond, and
corporate securities of the forty-nine companies. Figure 14
depicts in a slightly different manner the division of the
principal items of the twenty-two larger life companies as
a percentage of ledger assets. Finally, to emphasize more
definitely the year-by-year changes in investments, free
and
from the influence of prior holdings
,
Table XIII/Figure 15
are presented. These show acquisitions of various types of
securities for the years 1930, 1940, 1945 and 1946.
2. Government Bonds
In the classification of government bonds ere
three principal type s-Lni ted States Government Bonds, Foreign
Government Bonds and State, County and Municipal Securities.
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PERCENT OF EACH TYPE OF BOND & STOCK ACQUIRED
TO TOTAL ACQUISITIONS OF SUCH SECURITIES
Six Larger Life Insurance Companies - 1930, 19U0 & 19^5>
TABLE XIII
Difference
1930 i9Uo 19li5 1930-19W
BONDS
Governments
United States 5.2 U0.6 69 .
u
+ 6U.2
Canada 0.5 1.6 2.9 + 2.1|.
Total Government 5.7 U2.2 72.3 + 66.6
Municipal
United States NA 3.8 —
Canada NA 1.9 O.I4
Total Municipal 1U.8 5.7 o.k - m.u
Corporate
Railroad 23.0 11.9 8.1 - Hi.
9
Public Utility 25.6 19 .it 8.9 - 16.7
Industrial & Misc. 12.9 20.7 9.3 - 3.6
Total Corporate 61.5 52.0 26.3 - 3S.2
TOTAL BONDS 82.0 99.9 99.0 + 17.0
STOCKS
Railroad
Public Utility
Industrial & Misc.
2.3
h.9
10.8 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
- 2.1
- h.6
- 10.3
TOTAL STOCKS 18.0 0.1 1.0 - 17.0
TOTAL ALL BONDS &
STOCKS'* 100.0 100.0 100.0 —
Source : Annual Statements of Metropolitan Life, Prudential Life, Equitable
Life, New Yor^ Life, Northwestern Mutual and John Hancock for
years indicated.

COMPARISON ££ IN l/ESrrv\£NT^ op
FORTV-TWO MAJOR MF£ /AibQ>ft/1)4c£
COMPANIES MH5~ 4Nf> Mto
'n 6. /^)
KEY tbtSi-
l*UEST»Ml±
Soovj^e : WA«-i~ street OourAal.
j jafi.bjtotl

In 1930, the forty-nine legal reserve insurance companies
which have been used as a basis for most of these analyses,
held a little over $585,000,000 bonds of domestic States
and political subdivisions thereof. This represented
about 3.4$ of their total admitted assets. Investments
In this type of bonds increased slowly, both in dollars
and percentage of total, until 1940 when portfolios
included $1,777,000,000 worth, or 6.3% of assets. There-
after both dollar volume end the percentage have dropped
so that at the end of 1946 they were $440,000,000 and 1.0%
respectively. This decrease of a little over 75% in the
last five years is attributed to the fact that the high
prices which these securities have been demanding recently,
due to their tax-exempt status, have made them unattractive
to insurance companies. (1) Under Federal income tax
lews their tax-exempt status offers no particular advant-
age to insurance companies. (2)
The principal kind of foreign government bonds
included in portfolios of insurance companies are those of
the Dominion of Canada and political subdivisions of that
country. Although their relative importance has not
increased markedly (2.3% in 1930 and 2.9% in 1946), the
total holdings of Canadian Government bonds, including thos
(1) Satterfield, op. cit. P. 6.
(2) Loc. cit.
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of provinces and other subdivisions, jumped from about
$404,000,000 in 1930 to $1,227,000,000 in 1946, an increase
of over 203$J This growth is an indication of the strong
support which United States insurance companies gave to the
Canadian war effort. In recent years, the amount of bonds
of other foreign governments held by domestic insurance
companies has been negligible. Ever since 1920, when the
institutions held about $.39,000,000 ( 2 , 6% of assets) of
foreign government bonds, the holdings have been shrinking
steadily and quite rapidly until at present only about
$8,000,000 ere included in insurance portfolios. (1)
The story regarding the tremendous expansion of
holdings of United States Government Bonds under the impact
of World War II Is a familiar one to almost everybody by this
time. However, the fact that these holdings have continued
to grow during 1946, more than a year after the war's end,
may not be so v/ell known. The rate of increase in 1946 was
lower to be sure than during the war years but it was none
the less real. For all the United States life companies the
gain was $917,000,000 compared with a little over $4,000,000,000
In 1945. At the end of 194 5 the percentage of total assets
invested in Federal Government securities was 46.0$ for all
domestic life companies, 46.8$ for the forty-nine companies
previously referred to, (1) and 50.8$ for twenty- two whose
(1) Satterfield, ojd. ci
t
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holdings are shown in Figure 14. The percentages for the
twenty- two companies are based on ledger assets whereas the
other figures are a percentage of admitted assets, but, in-
asmuch as the difference between the two asset items is not
great, the percentages may be considered comparable. The
above 1945 percentages are si irhtly higher than the
corresponding ones for the following year 'which were 44.8$
for all companies and 46$ for the forty-nine. Data on the
other group are not available.
(Hereafter, for the sake of easy reference and to
avoid needless repetition, the terms "all", "forty-nine”
or "twenty- two” companies will be used to designate the
three different groupings used as a basis for the figures
in this section of the report. Statistics on the companies
in the first two classifications are taken from Mr. Dave
Satterfield's report entitled Life Insur ance Achievement
in 1946 (1) while those for the third have been compiled
from a study of annual statements of the companies concerned.
Reference will be made also to a group of forty-two major
life insurance companies and to a study of the six larger
companies. Figures on the former have been furnished by
reports in the ?/a 1 1 Street Journal, while those for the
latter have been drawn from the annual statements of the
Metropolitan, Prudential, Equitable, New York, Nor thwes tern
(1) Satterfield, op. ci
t
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Mutual and John Hancock life insurance companies.)
k study of acquisitions of United States Govern-
ment bonds will furnish another slant on the change in the
percentage of such securities held in insurance company
portfolios. In 1930, for example. Government bond
acquisitions for the six larger companies represented 5.2
$
of their purchases in 1930, 40.6$ in 1940 and 69.4$ in
1945 (See Table XIII). Inasmuch as data for this group are
not available for 1946, figures for the forty-two companies
are presented in Figure 15 which reveal the trend in the
year after the war’s end. Purchases for these major com-
panies which had totaled $6,300,000,000 in 1945 shrank to
almost one-third of that amount ($2,300,000,000) in the
following year. Putting it another way. Federal bond
acquisitions amounted to about two-thirds of the total in-
vestments made in 1945 and only a little over one-third
in 1946.
However, the most surprising thing is not that
purchases of government bonds have dropped but that the de-
cline has not been even greater in view of the dearth of
new issues. Probably two factors have entered into this
situation. One is the combination of the increasing amount
of funds to be invested, previously mentioned, and the
relatively small volume of new corporate securities being
offered. In order to keep funds from lying idle* companies
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have purchased large quantities of outstanding long-term
government bonds in the open market. In the second place,
some institutions, as a hedge against a possible increase
in interest rates in the near future, have added large
quantities of short-term governments to their portfolios.
According to unofficial reports this has been the policy
some of the leading American life companies, notably the
Equitable, Prudential and New York Life.
Despite the beginning in 1946 of a downward trend
in holdings of United States Government bonds, life companies
undoubtedly will continue to hold a large proportion
of these securities. (1) Although the rate of return is
low, the fact these bonds help to satisfy the statutory
provisions of those states which require that a certain
percentage of the Policy Reserve shall be invested in the
so-called "legal" investments, offsets to some extent the
low interest factor. If the United States Government con-
tinues its "selective redemption" policy, begun in 1946,
which is designed to reduce federal debt which may be used
as a basis for commercial credit expansion, the proportion
of the federal debt held by insurance companies may increase,
even though total dollar holdings may continue to decline.
3. Public Utility Bonds and Stocks
During the war years, the securities of the public
utility companies lost ground in relation to the total hold-
(1) Satterfield, op . c i
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ings of insurance companies even though their dollar volume
remained almost constant. However, from the point of view
of both the Volume and percentage of total assets, invest-
ments in stocks and bonds of these corporations have
registered gains over 1930 . In the earlier year, the forty-
nine companies held apt^r oxima tely $1 , 675 , 000,000 ( 9 * 7# of
assets) of public utility securities. The percentage peak
of 15,9% was reached at the end of 1941 when portfolios
included $4,774,000,000 public utility investments, but the
dollar volume climbed to $5 , 099 , 000,000 in 1944 , declined
to $4,948,000,000 in 19 45 and then made a sharp recovery
to a peak of $ 5 , 485 , 000,000 , at the end of 1946 . The
percentage figures for the twenty- two companies (Figure 15 )
correspond closely with those for the forty-nine.
These fluc tua ti ons in holdings are, of course, a
reflection of the acquisitions made over the span of years.
Whereas the six leading companies were investing over 50%
of their funds in public utilities (bonds and stocks) in
1930, these same institutions reduced the percentage of such
purchases to 19*4$ in 1940 and 9,2% in 1945. (Table k)
Carrying the comparison over into 194 6 by using the
acquisitions of forty-two companies, we fird that, although
the dollar volume decreased about $100,000,000, the percent-
age of public utility security acquisitions to total invest-
ments rose from 9.8$ in 1945 to 12.9$ in 194 6. (Figure 15)
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Under normal conditions, insurance companies are
interested only in top-quality issues and that standard ap-
plies to public utilities as well as other corporations. A
study of the holdings of the three larger life companies in
the United States (Metropolitan, Prudential and Equitable)
seems to indicate feat quality requirements are being
lowered, due largely in all probability to the unusually
high price of the triple-A bonds in the last two or three
years. (fable XI
V
) This analysis shows that public acquisi-
tions of top-quality ( uAAAn ) public utility bonds by these
three institutions were 66.5$ of the total in 1940 and only
34.8$ in 1945. The percentage of wAAn purchases did not
change materially (24.3$ in 1940 and 28.8$ in 1945) but
33.9$ of the public issues bought in 1945 were of t,AM grade
compared with 7.2$ five years earlier. Moreover, due large-
ly to the purchases of the Equitable, acquisitions of ^BBB”
and "BB" bonds showed an increase from 1.3$ to 3.2$. This
%
policy of buying second-rate public utility bonds is nothing
new to the Equitable. In fact, back in 1935, that company
purchased, after careful study and consideration of all
aspects of the situation, f;125, 000, 000 of bonds of under-
lying generating and distributing utility companies, many
of which were in the Insull, Associated and similar systems.
Although the Equitable had to absorb much criticism at the
time for buying what were considered second-quality utility
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securities, the company and its policyholders enjoyed a
fine return on those investments while iiiey were being
held and a good profit when they were taken away from them
as a result of refunding operations some years later. (1)
Obviously, extreme care has to b e exercised in
the selection of bonds with other than the highest quality
rating, in order not to violate the cardinal precept of
insurance company investment policy- security of principal.
The ratio of debt to net property ana coverage of interest
charges should meet the standards or tests outlined
previously, management must be capable and there must be
sound economic justification for the system, by investing
in second-quality utility bonds where such factors as those
are favorable, insurance companies have enjoyed a better
return on their investment tnan they would have if they had
purchased only "iULi" bonds, some of which, like the Madison
Gas and Electric issue mentioned earlier, have sold on yield
basis of less than 2,50^.
4. ?>.ailr pad nonds ana Stocks
Prior to the period of defaults in the early
thirties, railroad securities occupied a prominent position
in the portfolios of most insurance companies, although they
(1) Thomas I. Parkinson, "Low Interest Rates and Public
Welfare" C omme r c 1 a 1 a nd Financial Chronicle .
November 15, 1945.
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have been declining in relative importance since 1906, the
earliest year shown in Mr, Satterfield's report, (1) In
that year, the forty-nine insurance companies, owned slightly
more than $1,000,000,000 of railroad securities, a figure
which represented 35% of their assets. By reference to
Table A and Figures 12 and 13 we can see that, at the begin-
ning of the period vh ich we have under review, these same
companies held 02,848,000,000 bonds and stocks of railroads,
but this larger total only amounted to 17,8% of their assets.
At the end of 1935, the volume was about the same
(2,876,000,000) but their relative importance had slipped to
13,4%”, The increase of over $100,000,000 in the holdings of
railroad securities during the next five years was not in
proportion to the increase in total assets so that, by
December 31, 1940, they constituted only 10.6$ of the invest-
ment par- tf olio. This downward trend continued in both
dollars and percentage during the next six years with the
result that only 6.4$ of the assets (or $2,790,000,000) were
invested in railroad issues at the end of 1.946, The per-
centage figures for all U. S. life companies were 9.0$,
6.9% and 6,3$ for 1941, 1945 and 1946 respectively; those
for the twenty-two companies, 14.5%, 11.2$ and 7.5% in the
years 1935, 1940, and 1945 respectively.
As the figures on holdings indicate, acquisitions
(1) Satterfield, on. c it . P. 10-also Table A (Appendix)
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of railroad securities have declined, although a few
companies, such as the Equitable, at times have gone against
this trend and purchased substantial quantities at favorable
prices. In 1938 and 1939, when there was panicky selling
of railroad bonds, other ins ti tutions dumped a great volume
of them into the lap of the Equitable which snapped them up
at ridiculous prices. That company, for example, bought
Atchison General 4’s at 96 and "great gobs" of Central
Pacific’s in the Southern Pacific System at 75. (1) Of
course those purchases were made only after the company had
satisfied itself, through legal as well as statistical re-
search, that the c ourts would uphold the priority of the
underlying bonds as against second, third or later liens,
and that there would be a revival of heavy industry, which
would bring with it an upswing in railroad earnings.
However, the Equitable to the contrary notwith-
standing, acquisitions for the insurance business as a whole
have dropped sharply. Figures for the six larger companies
(Table XIII) indicate that only 8.3$ of bonds and stocks
purchased in 194 5 were "those of railroads. In 1930, the per-
centage was 25.3$ and, in 1940, 11.9$. Thus it appears that
the decline was sharpest during the thirties and was at a
slov/er rate from 1940 to 1945. Purchases of railroad issues
again dropped off severely In 1946 as shown by Figure 15
(1) Parkinson, 02 * cit . P. 2364.
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covering acquisitions of forty-two companies. The acquisi-
tions, in dollars, by this group which were $700,000,000 in
1945 amo\mted to less than half of this figure,
($300,000,000) in the following year. Percentagewise the
figure were 7 , 2% and 4.4% for the two years. This decrease
undoubtedly may be attributed in whole or in part to the
unskillful, and seemingly unfair, handling of the freight
rate case by the Interstate Commerce Commission which has
caused investors to look with a skeptical and pessimistic
eye on the future of the railroad industry and the soundness
of its securities. That this attitude may only be temporary
and that a year or so of profitable peace-time operations
unmarred by strikes, wage and rate disputes may restore
confidence in railroad bonds is suggested by the following
quotation:
A railroad is a manufacturing enterprise
and like any other .... .where there is
aggressive, alert and competent manage-
ment, a sound financial structure; a
modern economical plant and a good
territory s erved . . . .you have the
opportunity for a sound investment. (1)
As in the cose of public utility issues, the study
of the purchases of public issues of railroad bonds by the
Metropolitan, Prudential, and Equitable seem to indicate
that the insurance companies are satisfying their requirements
(1) Eas tern Und erwriter , June 7, 1946. P. 16
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with other than MAAAM securities in order to make their
rate of return on their investments slightly more favorable.
During 1940, over 35% of the railroad bonds purchased
publicly by these three companies were of ttAAA u or nAA n
quality, 37.2% were f,Au bonds and the balance, 27*2$,
were or lower. In 194 5, only 3.9$ of the railroad
purchases were wAAA rt or WAAW bonds, 69.1$! held “A'1 ratings,
8nd 21% were ttBBB u or below. (Table XIV ) Considering the
extremely low yields on the top-grade railroad securities
in the last two years (2.45,% on Union Pacifies, for example), ’
it is easy to understand why the insurance companies have
had to limit their total purchases of rsilroad issues and
select a larger percentage of the ttAn bonds.
5. Indus trial and Mis cellaneous Bonds and Stocks
The classification of bonds which has been attract-
ing increasing attention from the insurance companies are the
indus trials . One of the most aggressive companies in this
field' has been the Penn Mutual. Prior to 194 3, that company’s
holdings of industrial securit5.es varied from l\% to a little
more than 3% of its assets. Then in the Fall of 194 3 it
began to expand appreciably in this field, adding $9,000,000
of industrial securities to its portfolio in 1943,
$22,000,000 in 1944, $15,000,000 in 1945, and $31,000,000 in
the first nine months of 1946. (1) As a result of these ad-
ditions to its portfolio. Penn Mutual’s industrial holdings
(1) Ea s tern Und erwrit er , November 1, 1946.
‘I
'
-to
O J
•
•:
• d I U 0 . 1 - r •_.)£ I 3
rj.
’ riO n*i §v o*t
*
0*10 ' C
'
- 3 : > r ; : f:
’
• «. ,
.
i :o "
30 :
.
.
.
-
.
.
. .
.
_
•
;
r
.*.
• <
;
'
j -j v :j _• c-u* Z'' 3
.
. .
•
'
'
•
; -.,0 o anl 3 3 <: : r..lzwlo::I ,: x:I
.
•-
.
,
. ... j
'
‘
.
‘
'
•
•
-
t , • « t <
•
* <
-
.
*
' £C I Z . i ' irl : : Id • h
,
118
amounted to 10$ of its assets on September 30, 1946. OIL. er
companies, such as Northwestern Mutual, have found similar
opportunities for placing increasing sums in industrial bonds
and debentures. (1)
What has been the industrial securities picture for
the insurance business as a whole? Looking again at ‘Table A,
and Figures 12 and 1_3, we find that investments in “Other
3onds aid Stocks”, most of which are presumed to be indust-
rial, have sh own a steady and persistent, although not spec-
tacular, growth since 1933. Far the four preceding years
this category of securities amounted to around 3.0$ of total
investments, and between $543,000,000 to $581,000,000, By
the end of 1935, holdings had jumped over $200,000,000 to a
total of $789,000,000 which represented 3.7$ of assets. Dur-
ing the next five ye ars investments in this field more than
doubled and stood at $1,772,000,000 or 6.3$ of assets, on
December 31, 194 0. During the war years requirements of
industry for additional private capital were relatively
small, due to war-time restrictions on plant expansion and
federal grants to companies enga ed in war projects for the
government, with the result that only a little less than
$500,000,000 in industrial securities were added to insurance
portfolios during that time. On Decent) er 31, 1945, the per-
centage of such investments to total assets had declined
(1) Weekly Underwrit er
,
July 27, 1940.
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to 5,6%, Ho waver, as business began to get back into
normal production channels, wi th additional capital needed
to accomplish the reconversion process, the surge of in-
surance funds into industry in 194 6, through the purchase
of bonds, debentures and stock, swelled the total of in-
dustrial investment of the forty-nine companies to
|3,700,000,000 by the end of that year, 8.6$ of assets and
an increase almost $1,500,000,000 over 1945. For all dom-
estic insurance companies, the 1946 total is estimated at
$4,150,000,000 a ratio of 8.7$ of assets, and an increase
of $1,618,000,000 over the preceding year, Figure 14,
covering twenty- two leading companies, reveals correspond-
ing changes in the industrial ratios for this group.
Probably the best indication of the swing to in-
dustrial investments is given in Figure 15. Although the
total investments of the forty-two life companies there
shown dropped from $9,600,000,000 in 1945 to $6,600,000,000
in 1946, due largely to the decline in purchases of govern-
ment bonds previously discussed, adquisitions of industrial
and miscellaneous securities more than doubled in dollar
volume and increased from 8.4$ to 26.3/i of total purchases
in 1945 and 1946 respectively.
As far as the quality of industrial purchases is
concerned, the record of the three companies studied
(Metropolitan, Prudential and Equitable) seems to indicate
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a similar tendency in industrial acquisitions to that
which has been noted previously for public utilities and
railroads, namely, an increase in the proportion of bonds
with other than "AAA" rating. (Table XIV ) It must be
pointed out, however, that the figures used for the in-
dustrial comparisons are somewhat limited because a fairly
large percentage of industrial securities were purchased
privately and therefore have not been rated. Using the
limited data, we find that the most outstanding differences
between 1940 and 1945 are that, although 19 , 3% of the in-
dustrial bonds purchased publicly by the three companies in
the earlier year were of top quality, none of the acquisi-
tions in 1945 were of the highest grade; and that the
percentage of n BBB n bonds added to investment portfolios v/as
22.5$ in 1945 compared with 12.0$ in 1944.
Although the industrial field is wide open, pur-
chases of such securities entail very careful study and raise
problems not met in the public utility companies. For one
thing, earnings of moat industrial concerns are subject to
wide fluctuations, followin. closely the peaks and depressions
of the business cycle, vhereas stable earnings are necessary
to insure adequate coverage of interest charges. Secondly,
it is difficult to be a prophet and forsee what the demand
will be for a given product twenty or twenty-five years
hence. Finally, unless the laws of some of the states are
,
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changed to permit the classification of at least part of
the industrial security holdings of insurance companies as
Mlegal M investments, there is an artificial and arbitrary
ceiling on the volume of such bonds and stocks which may
be acquired. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties,
there appears to be a decided tendency on the part of many
companies to go out aggressively to get more industrial
inves tments
.
6. Stocks in Gene ro
1
Although investments in stocks, both preferred
and common, have been included in the totals for the rail-
road, public utility and industrial securities, some
separate discussion is required at this point because of
the increasing interest which some insurance companies have
been showing in equities in recent years. In the first six
months of 1946, 'life insurance holdings of stocks increased
38/4 over 1945, and reached a total of ^997,000,000, 81$ over
the 1941 figure, (1) However, this rate of increase
apparently was not maintained in the last half of the year
probably due in large part to the decline in the stock market
in September which chilled the enthusiasm of institutional
investors for equity securities. At the end of 1946, in-
vestments by life companies were about 27$ above the final
figures for 1945, judging from data for the forty-nine
(1) Eastern Underwriter , August 30, 1946. 12.
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companies included in Table A which show s 1946 year-end
total of §925,000,000 compared with a little over
§733,000,000 the preceding year. In the light of stock
hildings at the beginning of 1930, the growth in this
class of investment seems even more spectacular. Referring
again to Table A, we find that the forty-nine life companie
held only §321,000,000 of equities in that year. In other
v/ords there has been almost a three-fold increase in seven-
teen years I During the thirties the stock investments of
this same group of companies hung close to the §500,000,000
mark and did not advance materially until 1944 when acquisi
tions of almost §50,000,000 raised the total to over
§592,000,000 at December 31 of that year.
In the case of stocks, the traditional insurance
principle of conservatism has been observed and companies
lean toward the nblue chip 1 ' preferreds. At 'the end of
1946, 77
.
3% of the stock investments of the forty-nine
companies were in preferred and guaranteed stocks. Between
1930 and 1946 preferred stock investments increased approx-
imately 208% whereas common holdings gained only 140%,
It appears, however, that an increasing percentage of the
stock purchases in 194 6 were of common inasmuch as the
common holdings gained 40% in that year over 1945, while
the increase in preferred and guaranteed stocks was only
23%. Putting it another way, 85% of the net increase in
stock holdings between 1930 and 1946 consisted of preferred
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and guaranteed stocks but of ' the 1946 purchases only 69%
were of that type.
There are many indications that the insurance
companies are not being led into wholesale purchases of
stocks even w ith the lure of somewhat a ttra c tive-for the
time being at least-yields. In 1945, the Connecticut law
was changed to permit life companies of that state to in-
vest as much as 5% of admitted assets in any type of in-
vestment. Although this opened the door for purchase of
certain types of stocks, Aetna Life has increased its
stock holdings by only *'4,000,000 and an Aetna executive
stated that the new legislation had not affected their
investment policy to any great extent and that most of
their investment money was still going into bonds. (1)
An analyst writing in the September 16, 1946 issue of
arron * s Weekly about the large volume of electric
utility stocks which had glutted the merket about that
time had this to say:
I
It had been expected generally that low
interest rates would force some investors
who normally confine their holdings to
bonds and preferred stocks, to buying
operating company common stocks, but de-
mand from this source has been dis-
appointing. Although the early issues
were overpriced and unattractive in
relation to outstanding and seasoned
stocks, each subsequent offering has
(1) Investor » s Header , October 4, 1946. P. 2
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been made on a more liberal yield basis.
Yet demand still is small. Apparently the
large amounts of investrrent funds which,
have pushed interest rates to record low
levels are not fluid enough to flow freely
from senior to junior securities as had
been expected. (1)
Mr. B. Hollon Smith in an address before the
American Life Convention in October 1S46, pointed out
that the main obstacles to consideration of common stocks
as investments are; (1) the preconceived beliefs that
bonds anc mortgages ere inherently the only safe purchases,
(2) no suitable buy and sell formula can be devised to
eliminate the human or speculative element in the manage-
ment of the common stock portfolio; (3) there is no
solution to the problem of year-end valuation. (2)
In regard to the relative safety of bonds and
mortgages compared with common stocks, Mr. Smith called
attention to studies made by the National Bureau of
Economic Research which revealed that of the 3000 bond
issues brought out between 1900-1939 which had par amounts
of $5,000,000 or over, 19.59/0 were in default of principal
or Interest and that five years before default 5.54$ of the
defaulted bonds were rated AAA; 6 . 98$-AA; 14.24$-A; and
14.40$-Baa. (3)
(1) Barrons National Bus ine s s and Financia l Weekly ,
September 16, 1946.
(2) B. Hollon Smith, "Common Stocks for Life Insurance
Companies", address given October 9, 1946 before
American Life Convention in Chicago. P. 5.
(3) Ibid, P. 6.
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These figures illustrate that constant vigilance and
revision of the portfolio as economic conditions change
is as essential for bonds as it is known to be for
stocks and that without such attention, bond investments
may not, in the long run, be any safer than stock holdings.
With regard to points two and three, Mr. Smith
believes that "Control Plans" and "operating programs can
be devised which will remove the element of luck from
common stock investments and bring success to the investor
who is a long-term holder and is content with reasonable
profits", and that the problem of valuation could be
handled if insurance commissioners would agree that
"securities which represent perfectly sound companies are
to be carried at their cost price so long as companies
remain sound". (1) Since the validity of Mr. Smith’s
prof ram is predicated on the assumption that insurance
companies would not purchase securities at the peaks of the
business cycle, (2) there appears to be strong ground for
those who wish to question the soundness of his position.
Moreover, regardless of how insurance companies
feel about the wisdom or advisability of holding equities,
state laws, which differ greatly on this matter of stock
investments by life insurance companies, exercise a very
(1) B. Eollon Smith, 0£. cit . PP . 18 and 25
(2) Ibid. P. 26.
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great deal of control over or at lea a t influence strongly
the attitude and policy of most companies as they survey
or enter this field. New York's law, for example, pro-
hibits in investment by domestic companies in any stocks,
except preferred and guaranteed issues. An "in substance”
provision of the New York statutes has had the effect of
"tying practically the rest of life insurance America to
the New York State kite”. (1) That is to say, the
"foreign” companies (those domiciled elsewhere but
writing policies in New York) have been required to comply
with the requirements of that State. The following states
permit insurance companies domiciled there to invest in
common stocks within various limitations of assets, capital
and/or surplus: Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas and
Washington. Iowa, Michigan and Ohio do not permit such
investments. (2)
Since the report of theArmstrong investigation
in 1906 which has been mentioned earlier is undoubtedly
the basis for these legal restrictions, and serves as a
guide book for the investment officers of all American
life insurance companies, a portion of the report dealing
with stocks is quoted below. (The underlining has been
added by the writer of this report.)
(1) Shelby Cullom Davis, "Inves tment in Common Stocks by
Life Insurance Companies”, The Analys ts j ournal ,
July 1945. P. 5.
(2) Ibid. PP. 5 and 6.
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In yes tmerit
£
in s to cks should be pr ohibited.
.
They ere fundamentally objectionable, as the
corporation, instead of holding a secured
obligation, acquires a proprietary interest
in another business, with rights subject to
all indebtedness which may be created in the
conduct of it anc often direct liabilities as
stockholders. This interest must be
nourished and supported. Instead of being
a creditor with adequate security, to which
upon default the corporation may resort, it
assumed the responsibili tie s of proprietorship
and must contribute from the accumulations
provided by the policyholders in order to
sustain the enterprise. If the stock holdings
constitute a small minority the investment
is at the mercy of adminis tra tors chosen by
the majority stockholders. If the stock
interest be a large one, it is frequently
found advisable to increase it until a sub-
stantial control is effected, and the
insurance company is not only engaged in a
different enterprise, but directly under-
takes its management. (1)
Moreover, back in 1941 when hearings were being
held on possible changes in the New York insurance lav/s,
some of the top executives of the leading companies dis-
played a decided lack of enthusiasm for common stocks.
Mr. Frederick Ecker, Chairman of the Board of Metropolitan,
for example testified that he thought "it would be a sin
to utilize the policyholders’ funds of a life insurance
company to speculate in common stocks" and concluded that
"if the stock is sound, the obligation of that company is
more sound; and our belief is that we are wiser in adhering
to the practice of buying the obligations rather than the
equities in corporate enterprise". (2)
(1) Shelby Cullom Davis, op . ci
t
. P. 11
(2) Loc. clt
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The possibility of shrinkage in value is of
course one of the basic weaknesses and dangers in stock
investments. Mr. Lee P. Stack, Financial Vice President
of the John Hancock Futual Life Insurance Company, has
quoted the following examples to prove that a large percent-
age of such investments could jeopardize the successful
operations of insurance companies. Assuming that a company
which was fortunate enough to have a Surplus of 10/o-and very
few companies have this much-had invested 20 % of its assets
in stock, a decline of 50% in market value of its stock
investments would wipe out its surplus completely.
Admittedly a drop of 50)6 is somewhat extreme, but, in an
unduly inflated market, it cannot be dismissed as entirely
impossible. (The Dow-Jones Industrial Stock average was
off 89^/o in July 1932 and 50-1/5# in March 1938. (1)
However, to take a more nearly normal case Hr. Stack cites
the situation of a company with a Surplus of 5% and the
same proportion of its assets ( 20 , 0 ) invested in stocks.
Under those circumstances a drop of only 25 ,0 in values
would eliminate the surplus account
I
As far as the rate of return is concerned, the
advantages of common stocks may not be as great as if often
believed if the experience of one insurance company which
has long invested in common stocks can be considered typical.
(1) B. Hollon Smith, "Common Stocks for Life Insurance
Companies", address given before American Life
Convention, Chicago, 111. October 9, 1946.
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That institution found that for the period 1925-1940 in-
clusive, taking into account net profit from sales,
depreciation existing in the portfolio anc other factors,
the yield (on common stocks) would have been something less
than 3/6 , (1) Hovjever, a study of the ten larger life
companies in the United States suggests that those
institutions have been enjoying a somewhat better rate of
return on their total stock investments (preferred and
common) than they have earned on any of their other invest-
ments. The rates earned on stock holdings for those
companies in 1955, 1940, and 1945 were. 4. 5%, 4.6% and 4.2$,
compared with 4.2$, 4 , 4/6 and 4.3,; for Mortgage loans and
3.8>o, 3.4/o and 2.9/o on Bond holdings in those same years
(Table XV) • According to calculations of Moody’s Invest-
ment Service, the average yield of industrial stocks in
December 1945 was 3.6$, 3.8$ in early 1937 and 3.6$ in the
Spring of 1929. (2) In fact, "industrial stocks yielded
3.6$ or 1 ower in some part of every year between 1932 and
1940, except 1937." (3) It should be pointed out that the
figures quoted from Moody's refer to industrial stocks only
and do not include either rails or utilities.
Nevertheless, all of these figures seem to point
to the fact that stocks are not the "gravy train" invest-
(1) Shelby Cullom Davis,
_
0£. ci t . P. 12.
(2) Moody ’ s S to c k Survey, December 17, 1945, P. 30.
(3) Loc . cit.
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Yields ( /o) on Principal ^ss e t Items
Ten Larger Life Insurance Companies
of United Sta tea -1955
,
1940 and 1945
TABLE XV
1935 1940 1945
Real Estate - 1.5 5.0
Mortgage Loans 4.2 4.4 4.3
Bond s 3.8 3.4 2.9
Preferred Stocks)
Common Stocks )
4.5 4.6 4.2
Cash - - -
Mis cellaneous - -
Gross Assets 3.6 3.4 3.1
Source: Best's Life Reports
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ments which some advocates would try to prove. In fact
the crux of the whole matter was described succinctly by
Prudential's John W. Stedman in testimony previously
referred to:
Whether in order to diversify slightly
our assets and increase our income 2%
on less than b% of our total assets, we
should take the chance of incurring,
first, responsibility for other
businesses than our own-businesses
unregulated by Federal and state
commis s ions -and
,
second, criticism
that we had vaulted outside the
province of stewardship and trustee-
ship into the domain of economic power. (l)
7 . Mar tgage Loans
Traditionally mortgage loans have had the
reputation of being among the most desirable investments
for insurance companies. Since most aspects of the mort-
gage business have been discussed in some detail in the
chapter on investment tests and standards, the comments
at this point will be confined largely to the volume and
relative importance of mortgages in insurance portfolios.
During 1946, mortgages on both farm and other
properties showed improved trends after almost twenty years
of steadily declining importance. New mortgage financing
extended by life companies in the first nine months of that
year amounted to $1,127,000,000 which compares with
$703,000,000 in the first three-quarters of 194 5 and
(1) Shelby Cullom Davis, on. cit
.
P. 13.
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$959,000,000 during the wh ole of the t year. (1) 4
spokesman for Prudential said that his company had put
$246,000,000 into mortgages in 1946. (2) Other large
companies likewise have been showing substantial increases
in mortgage investments but "Prudential continues to lead
the mortgage field with 16$ of total assets invested in
more farm and home mortgages than any other company." (3)
That company maintains twenty-seven branch offices from
which highly- traine d technicians cover eleven hundred
cities in the Lnited States and Canada, making appraisals
and approving mortgages on the spot. (4) As a result of
its aggressive action, Prudential now holds over
$1,000,000,000 of mortgage loans out of a total of
$6,700,000,000 held by all domestic life companies. (5)
Studying the Figures in Table A, we find that, at the
beginning of 1928, total mortgages on the books of the forty-
nine life companies shown therein, amounted to $5,658,000,000
or 43.1$ of total assets. This was the peak year as far
as relative importance goes, although dollar volume
(1) Weekly Und erwrl ter , November 30, 19 46.
(2) Ljat Iona 1 und erwr it er , January 24, 1947 .
(3) Investor’s Header, October 4, 1946. P. 3.
(4) Loc . cl t.
(5) Loc. cit.
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continued to climb until the end of 1958 when it went a
little over the $7, 000, 000, 000 mark. In 1928, 15.1$ of
the assets were represented by farm mortgages and 28.0$
by mortgages on other types of property. By 1935, how-
ever, mortgages held by this group of companies had
fallen sharply to a little less than §5, 000 ,000,000 and
23.2$ of assets. The drop was most severe in the case cf
farm mortgages which at the end of that year amounted to
only 4.6$ of assets. In that era, farmers were faced with
rapidly falling prices a rd dwindling earnings, with the
result that foreclosures were numerous because many could
not meet interest and jrincipsl payments. The total amount
of mortgages increased somewhat in 1939 and 1940 so that
at the end of the latter year there were $5,339,000,000
of them on the books of the forty-nine companies,
$789,000,000 farm mortgages and $4, 550,000,000 on other property,
while farm mortgages continued to slump during the war
years, those on city real estate made some slight gains
dollar-wise and, at December 3L
,
1945, stood at $666,000,000
(1.6$ of assets) and $5,255,000,000 (12.5$ of assets)
respectively. Incidentally the mortgage experience of the
twenty- two larger companies, as depicted graphically in
Figure 14, is almost identical wL th the t of the large group
of companies.
As mentioned earlier the mortgage picture for in-

134
surance companies brightened considerably during 1946 when
the first gain since 1941-a small one to be sure-in the
amount of farm mortgages held by those institutions was
registered, and the total of other mortgages of the forty-
nine companies
,
increased $220,000, 000 (4.4$) over the
previous year. A comparison of the 1945 and 1946 figures
for all United States companies is given below: (1)
Farm Other Total
Mor tgages Mortgages Mortgages
1945 (000,000 »s omitted in dollar amounts)
Amount $>776 $5860 $6636
$ of Assets 1.7$ 13.1$ 14.8$
1946
Amoun t $800 $6200 $7000
$ of Assets 1.7$ 12.9$ 14.6$
$ Increase 1946
over 1945 3.1$ 5.8$ 5.5$
The gross rate earned on the mortgage invest-
ments of the ten larger life companies which wag 4.2$ in
1930, 4.4$ in 1940 and 4.3$ in 1945, seems to indicate that
(1) Dave E. Satterfield, Jr. on. clt. P. 7.
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the mortgage business is a profitable one for the in-
' surance companies. (See Table XV
)
. Although the
deduction of service fees, originating commissions,
principal losses and home office expenses reduces the
net return 1. 0^-1. 5$ to about 3$, based on figures of
four life companies, given in Table XVI on the following
page, the mortgage field still appears attractive to com-
panies struggling to earn a sufficient return on their in-
vestments to meet the 3$ rate required to maintain policy
reserves
.
As to the future, if difficulties between
management' snd labor are solved, it is thought that con-
siderably more than $10, 000, 000, 000 a year will go into
buildings throughout the nation, including commercial and
industrial developments. If such full production dreams
materialize during the next five years, it is estimated that
well over $ 5, 000, 000,000 a year should be invested in mort-
gage loans during that period. (1)
Two additional points regarding mortgages which
were brought out by Mr. Murray Shields, vice president of
the Bank of the Manhattan Company in his address before the
American Life Convention on October 8, 194 6 are worthy of
mention. First of all, this economist feels that, when the
(1) National Und erwriter, January 24, 1947.
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building industry swings into high gear, "life insurance
companies and savings banks may well be able to fill all or
most of their investnent needs from new mortgages,” in which
case competition between those institutions and the
commercial banks for other types of loans and investments
will decline materially with the self-evident result that
the "buyer of credit will no longer be able to shop around
successfully.” (1) Secondly, Mr. Shields believes that,
although the quoted rates for mortgage loans may not rise
much in the next few years, net rates will improve because
of the elimination of fee absorption and of premium pay-
ments by the buyer of mortgages, as a result of reduced
pressure for such payments which should follow the increase
in the volume of new mortgages.
8. Policy Loan s end Premium Notes
During the year 1946
,
considerable stir was created
in insurance circles by the announcement of the Mutual Life
of New York that, effective September 1, 1946, it would
reduce the interest rates charged on loans made to policy-
hilders. In place of the conventional 6% flat rate provided
for in most policies, a graduated scale of on the first
$750, 4/6 on the next $750 and 3$ on any excess over $1500,
was introduced. This was the first action taken by any of the
(1) Murray Shields, "Inflation, Interest Rates 8nd Investment
Policy*', Bank of the Manhattan Company, N. Y. 1946.
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larger companies in recent years to conbat the steadily
declining volume outstanding policy loans wh ich again is
clearly evident from Table A and Figures 12 and 13. The
apex of this type of asset for the companies shown by
those cherts occurred in 1952 and 1933 when a total of a bout
£ 3, 400, 000, 000 in loans had been extended to policyholders
who found themselves in serious financial straits during the
depression of the early thirties. This figure represented
17.9$ and 17.8$ of total assets in 193 2 and 1933 respect-
ively. In 1935, the ratio of policy loans to assets was
14.9; in 1940, 9.7$; in 194 5, 4.2$, and in 194 6, 3.8$. An
almost identical decline may be noted in Figure 14 which
covers twenty- two companies. For all life companies in the
bnitea States as a v\hole, there was a net decrease of about
§87,000,000 in such assets in 1946, a more moderate rate of
decline than during the four preceding years. The total out-
standing policy loans of all companies on December 31, 1946
amounted to (l ,875,000,000. , lowes t total for this class since
1927, and only 3.9 of total assets. (1)
After Mutual Life announced the reduction of in-
terest rates on loans, several other life companies sent
letters to their field forces giving the views of the
respective companies on Mutual's policy. These letters point-
ed out that life insurance should discourage borrowing rather
(1) b8ve E. Satterfield, crp. c i t . P. 7.
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than make it easier, cited the expense involved in handling
the large number of small loans, and the necessity of main-
taining large liquid funds to make loans available on
demand, and predicted that the lower rates might cause loss
of interest income and thereby add to the cost of life
insurance. (1) Mr. Thomas I. Parkinson, President of
Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York, in an open
letter forum conducted by The Spec ta tor
,
made the following
c omments
:
We • . . .be lieve that our loans on policies
are not primarily a net ter of investment,
but rather a matter of service required
by law. We still believe that a policy
loan is too often the first step toward
discontinuance of the policy and we still
emphasize the desirability of continued
protection. Notwithstanding the invest-
ment problem which all life companies
face, we prefer not to encourage policy
loans, and we do not think of them as
providing opportunity for investment
income but rather as a service to meet
the emergency needs of our policyholders. (2)
Insurance Commissioner W. Ellery Allyn of
Connecticut believes life insurance companies shouldn't en-
courage policyholders "to burden their policies with debt,
either by tempting them wi th a low policy loan rate or
otherwise . " ’'Even though such a low rate,” he continued,
"superficially may appear to benefit the borrower, yet in
the long run the company has done the borrowing policy-
holder no favor." (3)
(1) Eas tern Und erwri ter- August 16, 1946. P. 1.
(2) The Spectator , September 1946
(3) Eastern Underwriter, August 14, 1946, P. 6.
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In the face of opposition or a t least scowls of
disfavor from mos t of the rest of the insurance industry.
Mutual has continued to publicize and push its new sliding
sc8le interest plan. The company is stressing the follow-
ing advantages which policy loans have over bank loans, (1)
(1) The rates charged on policy loans are
true interest rates rather than dis-
count rates. Example: A 3% discount
rate on an installment loan paid off in
12 equal monthly payments is equivalent
to 5 , 81% on a true interest basis.
(2) No investigation is conducted.
(3) The transaction is confidential.
(4) The funds are made available promptly.
(5) The interest rate cannot be increased
without at least 12 months' advance
notice.
(6) The loan cannot be called.
(7) The loan has no definite maturity date.
(8) The loan can be repaid on any basis you wish.
(9) You keep possession of your policy.
The reduction of Mutual Life's policy loan interest
rates September 1, apparently has produced the desired results
(1) Uni ted Sta tea News, February 7, 1947. P. 4
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of regaining substantial amounts of this business which had
been going to banks offering; lower interest rates than those
prevailing among life companies generally. Mutual’s policy
loans declined §300,000 to §500,000 per month for the first
eight months of 1946, continuing an almost uninterrupted
shrinkage in its oustanding policy loans which began in
1933* However, since the lower rates were made affective
it has been reported that the volume of new loans an 6 the
total policy loan portfolio have increased substantially. (1)
Whether other life companies will f ollow Mutual’s lead and
reduce the rates on their policy loans also, remains to be
seen.
9. Real Es ta te Hold ings
.
Although tot 8 1 real estate holdings of life in-
surance companies continued, in 1946, the downward trend
which began in 1938, there are many indications that this
trend will be reversed soon, possibly in 1947. Some states, like
New York, California snd Connecticut have modified their laws
recently to permit insurance companies to own and hold real
estate for investment; others are contemplating similar
action; while insurance companies domiciled in states which
have long permitted real estate holdings are finding increas-
ing opportunities for the purchase of income producing
(1) National Und erwriter , December 27, 1946
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property, such as stores, air eady constructed, the erection
of housing projects for wale or rent and the construction
of business property to be leased to others. Before dis-
cussing some of these developments in. detail, let us see
what the data for the forty -nine larger life companies
(Table A and Figures 12 and 13) show about the volume end
relative importance of real estate in insurance company
per tf olios •
The beginning of 1930 found the real estate
account of these companies at $>339,000,000, or 2,1% of
all assets. Small increases were made during the next three
or four years but it wasn’t until 1933 that the first major
upsurge occurred, probably under the influence of depression
foreclosures, particularly of farm property. Heal estate
holdings in that year increased $356,000,000 or about 47.6/S
over the previous year. The build-up of this class of in-
vestments continued through 1937, a t wb. ich time the forty-
nine insurance per tf olios contained $1,930,000,000 of real
estate holdings, representing Q,0% of their assets, much of
which undoubtedly was ”dis tress” or foreclosed mortgaged
property. When the companies were able to dispose of these
holdings, their investment in real estate slid off rather
rapidly, in both dollar vol rne and the ratio of real estate
to total admitted assets; and, at the end of 1946, the
tots! of their real estate holdings was a mere $625,000,000
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or 1.5% of assets. For all United States life companies,
the percentage was 1.6% on December 31, 1946 as against
1.9% at the end of 1945, and the volume was $775,000,000,
the lowest amount since 1931. (1)
Since the first of 1946, Aetna Life has led off
in an untried investment field-department store real
estate. (2) Its first step in this direction was the
i
purchase for $6,500,000 of the land and building of
Bamberger’s in Newark, IT, J. In September 1946, that
company added the properties of six California stores to
its holdings, an investment of $10,000,000. (3) Another
Connecticut company, the Connecticut Mutual Life purchased
for investmerit in July 1846, at an undisclosed price, a
piece of property in the retail district. of Chicago, which
is under a lease to the F. W. Woolwarth Company which
expires in 2017. (4)
The Equitable likewise has turned its attention
to the real estate field as a result of the amendment of
New York’s insurance law in 1946 to permit insurance com-
panies to purchase and hold income properties for investment.
One of its outstanding acquisitions of this kind was the
purchase early in 1947 of the Bonwit Teller store building
(1) Dave E. Satterfield , oo. cit. P. 8.
(2) Investor ’
s
Header, October 4
,
1946. P. 2.
(3) Investor ' Reader
,
October 4, 1946. P. 2.
(4) Boston News Bureau
,
July 23, 1946.
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on Fifth Avenue in New York City. It has been reported
that the price paid for this property was $6,250,000,
a rate of $275 per square foot, the highest rate ever
known to have been paid for a Fifth Avenue building. (1)
Moreover, New York real estate men are spreading rumors
that life companies are planning to put approximately
$30,000,000 into Fifth Avenue real estate. (2)
In its first transaction under the 194S amend-
ment to the New York law referred to in the previous para-
graph, Mutual Life of New York purchased, late in 1946,
seven large retail stores of Sears Roebuck and Company. (3)
In February 1947, the same institution bought seven additional
retial properties of Sears, all located in California. (4)
The fourteen stores have been leased to the mail order house
for a long term.
Purchases of s tore property apparently are being
encouraged by the retailers, because, with the ownership
in the hands of the insurance companies, their real estate
investment is freed and made available for expansion and other
merchandising purposes. (5) On the other hand, these in-
vestments ±iouId prove profitable to the insurance companies,
(1) National Underwriter, January 31, 1947. P. 21.
( 2 ) Loc. cit
.
( 3 ) National Ind erwriter
,
Decerrber 27, 194 6. P. 13.
(4) Weekly Dno erwri ter
,
February 15, 1947. P. 491.
(5) National bnd erwriter, January 31, 1947. P. 2.
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if the usual careful scrutiny is made of economic factors,
shopping trends and other elements bearing on the long-run
success of the enterprise to which the acquired property is
to be leased.
Another interesting development in real estate
investment by insurance companies is seen in the announce-
ment that contracts had been let by Metropolitan Life late
in the Summer of 194 6 for the erection of a nineteen-story
structure at Fifty-first Street and Fifth Avenue in Hew
York on the site of the old Cornelius Vand erbil t home
.
The first three floors of the new building will be occupied
by City bank Farmers Trust Company and the other sixteen
floors will be leased to the Cr owell-Collier Publishing
Company. (1) A similar project has been arranged by
hew York Life v/hich recently completed an agreement with
Continental Can Company for the construction of new
manufacturing facilities for the latter which it is estimated
will cost in the neighborhood of 110,000,000. (2) The
plants will be leased to Continental on a long-term basis.
Probably the most widely-publicized and lucrative
type of real estate investment was pioneered in 1922 by Met-
ropolitan in the construction of a mammoth housing; develop-
ment. Since then that company has invested over (^100,000,000
( 1 ) Eastern Lnd erwriter -Aug ust 2, 1946. ^ . 1.
(2) Weekly Und erwrit er , January 11, 1947. P. 176.
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in the same field. (1) When present projects have been
completed, total occupancy of Metropolitan housing will be
31,500 families. (2) Although no information has been re-
leased by the company regarding the exact rate of return
from their housing investments, it admits that it is well
above the average. Guesses as to the figure run as high
as 10$. (3) General experience indicates that housing
offers a virtually sure net return of (4)
Soine of the other big insurance companies like
Equitable of New York, Prudential, New York Life and John
Hancock have begun to move into the housing field but have
been running into material end cost troubles. The
Institute of Life Insurance repcrted in Aug; us t 1946 that
construction by life companies of §150,000,000 of rental
housing, which will provide homes for 75,000, either had
been started at that time, or was scheduled to begin within
a year. (5) Total housing being financed by these com-
panies on an ownership basis w as estimated at vl25,000,000,
consisting of homes for 150,000. (6) Twenty housing projects
(1) Inves tor * s Reader-October 4, 1946.
(2) Investor’s Reader , October 4, 1946.
(3) Loc . ci t
.
(4) National Unaerwrit er , August 2, 1946. P. 4.
(5) Na tlonal Underwrit er , August 2, 1946. P. 6.
(6) Loc . cit.
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«
In ten states are under construction or are being operated by
life insurance companies, and additional units of which
public announcement has not yet been made are being planned
or are under consideration by about twenty companies not yet
active in this field. (1)
Instead of building houses for rent as is beirgr
done by Metropolitan (Parkchester and Stuyvesant Town in
New York), John Hancock (Hancock Village in Hrookline,
Massachusetts), and others, California-Western States Life
Insurance company has planned its Lakewood City Housing
Project for s ale rather than rental. (2) Mr. 0. J. Lacy,
President of that company who discussed this development
before the American Life Convention in October of 1946,
stated that there are seven steps in a plan of that kind:
(1) selection of suitable land, (2) employment of competent
engineers to plot the land, (3) selection of a builder of
ability and integrity, (4) selection of a selling agency
which will undertake to sell the homes at a minimum commiss-
ion, (5) establishment of an adequate system of accounts to
permit definite control of funds, (6) tying in of the owner
with a selling agency to provide that where loans are placed
on homes that are sold, such loans are to be carried by the
owner, and (7) securing of loans at a discount instead of a t
(1) National. Underwriter , August 2, 1946, p. 6
(2) Natl onal Und erwrlt er , October 11, 1946.
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premiums paid for FHA and G1 loans. (1) ’Scarcity of
building materials, uncertainty of building costs, and the
interminable and ever- changing governmental edicts” were
mentioned by Mr. Lacy as some of the problems vhich were
delaying the actual construction work at Lakewood City (2)
and are likewise hampering other insurance companies in
carrying out their housing plans.
Investment officials of life companies as well
as general officers see in housing for the ”white collar”
group a ”funds mental ly sound investment medium for company
funds”. (3) The advantages which may accrue to life in-
surance companies which are active in the home construction
field have been effectively classified by a housing official
of the John Hancock as follows: (1) safety of investment,
(2) adequate rate of return, (3) satisfactory public
relations, (4) the application of premium income to human
needs, (5) the improvement in mortality experience resulting
from good housing, and (6) civic betterment. (4) Of these
six advantages, the be tter-than-a verage rate of return which
seems to be one of the best counter measures against low in-
terest levels resulting from the government’s cheap- money
(1) National Und erwriter , October 11, 1946.
(2) Natl onal Und e rwr it er , October 11, 1946.
(3) Loc. cit .
(4) Loc
.
cit.
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policy, is probably the principal factor in the tremendous
increase in popularity of housing developments among life
insurance companies. (1)
. (1) Nat ional Underwrit er, August 2, 1946
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IV* General Inves trnent Policiea
Past, Present and Future
A, Policies Reflected in Compos ition of Present Portfolios
1, Cultivation of "Priva te Deals "
Whereas previous chapters have discussed in detail
the investment policies, plans and procedures of life insur-
ance companies with reference to specific types of investments,
consideration will be given here to several broad policies
applicable to and reflected in one or more of the various
fields previously mentioned. The first of these is the cul-
tivation of so-called "private desls" in the purchase of
industrial and public utility securities which first came
into prominence in the early thirties after the establish-
ment of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The term "private deal" refers to an agreement,
made directly or through the medium of a liaison agent, be-
tween a borrower and an insurance company for the sale and
purchase respectively of some class or classes of securities
(bonds and/or stocks). This procedure is in contrast to the
public offering of securities through an investment banking
concern or group which underwrites the entire issue and then
resells the bonds or stock to the public.
Data for 1930, 1940 and 1945 for bond purchases
by the six larger United States life insurance companies
which is reflected in Figures sixteen, seventeen, eighteen,
and nineteen, indicate a great deal of variation not only
'.
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between companies but also between the public utility and
industrial security sections. For example, in 1950, 57.7
per cent and 53.2 per cent of industrial and miscellaneous
bond purchases of Metropolitan and Prudential, respectively,
were private deals while only 4.4 per cent of Fquitables
industrial bonds were purchased privately in that year. In
1940, the ratio of private industrial purchases to total
industrial investments for the six companies varied from
59.0 per cent for the Metropolitan to 92.2 per cent for the
John Hancock with an average of 64,7 per cent (Figure six-
teen) . However, it should be pointed out that the dollar
volume of the latter company ($590,000) was insignificant
beside that of the Metropolitan ($103,760,000). The 1945
average in the Industrial a.nd Mis cellaneous classification
for the six companies was 83.5 per cent, with the percentage
for the individual institutions ranging from 48.0 per cent
(New York Life) to 94.9 per cent (Metropolitan).
"Private deals" in the public utility field did
not exist in 1930 to speak of so that the first significant
data shown in Figure seventeen are for the year 1940. In
that year. Prudential led the other five companies with a
ratio of private to total purchases of utility bonds of
91.6 per cent; the Metropolitan was low with 34.9 per cent;
and the six-company average was 61.6 per cent. In 1945,
public purchases in this field exceeded private acquisitions
which amounted to only 43.2 per cent of the total for the
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six companies as a whole. Prudential, which, as noted
above, was high in 1940 with 91.6 per cent dropped to the
bottom of the pile in 1945 with only 19.4 per cent of its
public utility purchases made privately, while the Metro-
politan and the Equitable registered 62.8 per cent and
65.4 per cent respectively. (Figure seventeen)
.
The combined figures for both the public utility
and industrial and miscellaneous groups are shown graph-
ically in Figure eighteen. From this it can be seen that
the relative importance of private deals for the six com-
panies combined has been increasing but at a much slower
rate from 1940 to 1945 than in the preceding ten years
(17.4 oer cent in 1940, 63.2 per cent in 1940, and 70.0
per cent for 1945) . The records of the individual com-
panies
,
however, vary considerably. Metropolitan, Equitable
and Northwestern have increased the percentage of private
deals to total purchases of the two groups of bonds studied.
On the other hand, the Prudential and the New York Life,
as well as the John Hancock to a lesser extent, appear to
have picked up in 1945 far more industrial and utility bonds
from public offerings than they acquired in that manner in
1940. 'The figures for 1940 and 1945 respectively were 81.0
per cent and 34.0 per cent for the Prudential; 66.9 per
cent and 37.1 per cent for the New York Life, and 62.0 per
cent and 51.7 per cent for the John Hancock.
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The dollar volume of private purchases (Figure
nineteen) for the Prudential and hew York Life also was
lower in 1945 than in 1940, while that of the other four
158
companies, including John Hancock w.as up. The Metropolitan
and Equitable were neck and neck with $246.4 million and
$224.1 million dollars respectively. Their closest com-
petitors in the amount of private bond purchases (utilities
plus industrials and miscellaneous) only had about one- third
as much volume. (Northwestern $84.4 million and John Hancock
$80.3 million)
•
From the point of view of the insurance companies
these private deals have certain very definite advantages
which have encouraged some of them to adopt recently very
agressive steps in order to invest a larger proportion of
their available funds in securities bought directly from
the issuing companies. One insurance company has located
one of its investment officers in a large middle-wes tern
city to offer advice and assistance on bond financing problems
to industrial concerns in that section. Another institution
is reported to have less experienced contact men in many of
the larger cities across the country whose primary purpose
is to persuade prospective longterm, large-scale borrowers
to arrange their financing requirements with that company.
One advantage is that in a private financing oper-
ation, an insurance company can "trade out" the terms and
provisions of the loan to get more desirable security and
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protective provisions in the mortgage indenture than are
offered in many public issues. For example, most companies
insist on a limitation on the issuance of additional bonds,
a maintenance and depreciation covenant which specifies that
a certain percentage of operating revenues (the percentage
varying with the type of company) be expended or set aside
each year for maintenance, repairs and/or improvements, a
sinking fund which will retire a substantial portion of the
loan by maturity, a restriction on the payment of common
dividends except out of earnings accumulated after the loan
is made, the maintenance of working capital at a specified
level in relation to the fixed or mortgage indebtedness,
and other similar provisions, many of which sometimes are
not included in the indentures covering public issues.
In the second place, the insurance company usually
is able to obtain a higher rate of return on such private
investments than can be earned on securities bought publicly,
inasmuch as the borrowing companies often are willing to pay
a premium in order to avoid the trouble and expense of regis-
tering the issue with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the long run the saving of this registration expense gives
the borrower a lov/er net cost than he would have had on a
public offering.
Moreover, in a private deal, the financing insti-
tution is in a position to set the redemption prices on the
securities sufficiently high to do one of two things -- either
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discourage the borrower from refunding the issue at a lower
rate if interest rates should happen to decline a few years
after the loan has been floated, or permit the company a
reasonable profit in the event that the bonds are redeemed
or refunded. Once an issue of bonds has been purchased an
insurance company seldom voluntarily disposes of them. They
are bought with the intention of being held to maturity,
since constant turnover in investments unnecessarily in-
creases the expense of the investment department and re-
duces the net earnings. Hence, any action which tends to
restrict the redemption of holdings, except at a profit
large enough to compensate for the extra expense involved
in reinvesting the funds, is desirable from the insurance
company’s point of view.
Finally, in private deals, insurance companies
are able to find out at all times exactly what is going on
in the borrowing company and are in a position to appraise
the company and its prospects. Quarterly financial state-
ments which must be submitted by the borrower are analyzed
carefully. If information which is obtained from the state-
ments or other sources reveals any unfavorable factors or
potential danger spots, financial officers of the insurance
company meet with the management of the concern to which
money has been loaned to discuss the situation. Such con-
ferences are held not for the purpose of controlling or
interfering with management but with the aim of giving
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counsel, advice, and assistance which may help to rectify
the points of weakness, to the mutual advantage of the
borrower and the insurance company.
2. Increase in Canadian Inves tments
During the last few years some life companies
have been expanding their Canadian investments, both
governmental and private, to a considerable degree.
Although the trend in this direction, as indicated by
Table X, has not shown as pronounced an upswing as is
sometimes imagined, the volume of Canadian securities
held by the forty-nine United States life insurance
companies did show a considerably greater percentage in-
crease during the years 1941 - 1945 (55.9 per cent) than
the domestic investments (36.0 per cent). However, the
Canadian increase, because it was based on much smaller
totals did not increase substantially the relative impor-
tance of Canadian securities in the investment portfolios
of the companies -- 3.3 per cent in 1941 against 3.8 per
cent in 1945. Undoubtedly the figures of several indi-
vidual companies, judging from a hasty review of their
annual statements, would show a much greater Increase in
the proportion of Canadian investments than the above-
mentioned averages do.
One of the main attractions of the Canadian issue
of course is the higher yield obtainable, compared with the
return on comparable securities of United States companies.
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For example, while the average yield on all industrial
investments made in 1946 by one of the larger United
States insurance companies was 5.28 per cent, the rates
of return on individual Canadian investments made by that
company ranged from 5.50 per cent on first mortgage bonds,
to 5.54 per cent and 5.67 per cent on some twenty year
debentures and 4.40 per cent on a two million dollar issue
of cumulative preferred stock. In the second place, domes-
tic companies stand to gain additional profits from fluctu-
ation in exchange rates. Although such supplemental gains
are unpredictable and therefore strictly speaking, specu-
lative, it appears that the variations in currency exchange
rates between the two countries, have added considerable
funds to the insurance companies’ treasuries. Whe ther the
present exchange rate will continue to be weighted, in our
favor remains to be seen and only time can tell. Thirdly,
the potential earning power of Canadian industries, which
are faced with rapidly expanding markets and growing demand
for tneir products, as well as a seemingly more reasonable
attitude on the part of labor, seems excellent.
As for the disadvantages which might be mentioned,
three stand out as being of particular significance. One
is the extra work and expense involved in the transfer of
funds for payment of Canadian purchases. Although many of
these details are handled by and through the facilities of
the banking connections maintained by the insurance companies.
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there are many time-consuming administrative and bookkeeping
matters which require particular attention and special
handling by the bond accounting sections of the insurance
companies
.
The second potentially unfavorable factor which
must be considered when buying Canadian issues is that, up
to now the utilities and industrial concerns of Canada have
been subject to much less strict supervision and control by
governmental agencies. Occasionally this deficiency may
work out to the benefit of bondholders -- as for example,
in the case of enforced utility rate reductions which are
frequently ordered by the public service commissions in the
States -- but, in general, it is agreed that the supervision
of the Federal and state governments has brought about many
desirable improvements in the accounting and general operat-
ing procedures of American companies, as well as in the
matter of full disclosure of all pertinent information re-
garding new securities being brought on the market and about
the company issuing them.
A final potentially unfavorable element in Canadian
investments is the growing tendency in some of the provinces
toward the nationalization of industry. In Quebec, for
example, a governmental agency, the Quebec Hydro-Electric
Commission, which has been given broad powers of supervision
and control of electric utilities, has expropriated the
assets of one of the larger electric companies in Canada.
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(Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company), Similar develop-
ments elsewhere all tend to add a tinge of uncertainty to
the future of pr ovate enterprise in Canada, and suggest
the necessity or advisability of caution in adding Canadian
securities to the insurance company portfolios,
3, Sale and Redemption of Securities a
t
a. Profit
Since life insurance companies buy for invest-
ment and not for speculation on the appreciation in value
of securities, most of them follow the policy advocated by
a former treasurer of one of the larger life companies --
MNever sell anything”. Naturally, there must be excep-
tions to this general rule to insure that any weak or
potentially weak bond or stock is eliminated from the
portfolio but, in general, the voluntary turnover of
insurance investment holdings is negligible. Among the
many factors which enter into discussions regarding the
advisability of selling insurance company investments
are the following! (1) cost; (2) present market price;
(3) call price; (4) yield on present holdings; (5) future
earning power of company whose securities are now held;
(6) availability of other investment outlets for proceeds
of sale; and (7) yield on possible replacement securities.
Occasionally careful consideration and weighting of these
various items may indicate that a switch in securities may
be beneficial but as mentioned above such instances are
rare in the carefully selected portfolios of insurance
.: : *
’
-
-
.
.
.
•
qi V r Xi ; told o • o n-iltf • o 1 v 1 <; n ' a i
•-•
r
i
•
• / i *i< : < ' 'i:.
...
. / • O' '!j ic orro 1o iftiasarat
-
: ..
•
..I d t •
;r : *r
, v . , - .. ' e ,
* 1 ' !
e .
‘ '
or • o- . - ; o
1 ;
•' • ' ••
•: c r>. . :• :
.
: j
'
:
’
1 . d : • • (- , • 0 -v l) : : . v *x
O'.: :
'
.
,
. : :
-
. j o ; c .
.
.
.
'
, d ; ;
jeerid 1c ' • •
a- \ • • cd .. k . . i-. , i ’ c - -lev
'> r
; _ "> Z O'* ..
’ C . 0 - C • - i - ~ ' OC:
1 -i'- Xx/lorrso erd ni 01 ! *m
165
companies
•
On the other hand, involuntary dispositions
occur whenever the issuing company finds it possible and
advantageous to redeem completely or refund at a lower
rate of interest, before maturity, its outstanding bonds
and/or preferred stock. This situation has prevailed
especially during the last two or three years (1943 - 1946)
when interest rates dropped to unbelievably low levels,
and when cash reserves and surplus of many companies had
reached new highs as a result of war-stimulated production
and sales. Now most securities provide that if they are
called, ie. redeemed and paid, before their fixed maturity
date, the holder of those securities will be paid a premium
by the issuing company in addition to their face value, as
partial compensation for the loss ,of interest and the work
involved in reinvesting the funds. Consequently, all in-
surance companies which have been among the largest holders
of issues called have enjoyed a nice profit on those re-
deemed investments. A good illustration of profits of
this kind was given in an earlier chapter in which the
purchase of second-grade utility and certain selected rail-
road bonds by the Equitable of New York was discussed; (1)
practically all insurance companies have shared in such
gains
.
(1) Cf . ante , pp. _93 and 96
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4. Maintenance of Strong Current Position
At various times during the past sixteen years,
insurance companies have thought it desirable to maintain
a strong current position in anticipation of a rise in
interest rates. Accordingly they have increased their
holdings of short-term securities and/or allowed their
bank deposits to build up to unusually high levels so that
they would be in a position to buy securities at rates of
interest higher than those prevailing when the funds ori-
ginally became available for investment, instead of having
them tied up in long-term investments with a relatively
low yield
.
One or two illustrations will explain and clarify
the theory behind this program of building up cash reserves
when interest rates are exceptionally low. If one hundred
dollars is invested for twenty years a t 3^ per cent, the
total return would be seventy dollars, whereas the same
amount invested at 4^ per cent would provide an identical
return in fifteen and one-half years. In both cases, the
item of compound interest has been ignored, but it is
apparent that if interest rates improved during the first
four and one-half years after the funds became available
for investment, the investor would be as well off if he
allowed the money to lie idle as if he invested it at the
prevailing low rotes. If it is assumed that funds would be
invested for more than twenty years at the low interest
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return, the period during which the money could be allowed
to be idle without jeopardizing investment income would be
lengthened. For example one hundred dollars invested at
7>\ per cent for thirty years would provide the same return
as one hundred dollars invested at 4| per cent for twenty-
three years and four months. (1) Although the rates of
interest used in these illustrations are not in accord
with those prevailing and anticipated at the present time,
they serve to demonstrate the theory which justifies the
accumulation of cash reserves and large investments in
short-term securities when the nadir of interest rates is
presumed to have been reached.
In the middle thirties, when policies of this
kind were being advocated, Municipal bonds with but a few
years to maturity and short-term United States Government
bonds were suggested as the most promising temporary out-
lets for investment funds. (2) Tax notes which run less
than one year, notes of the large automobile finance com-
panies, and one- to-f our-ye8r bonds of railroads and public
utilities were also considered at that time as possible
short-term investments.
(1) Intra-office Memorandum of J ohn Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, dated November 6, 1935.
(2) In tra -office Memorandum of c ohn Hancock Insurance
Company, dated November 6, 1935.
'•>
<
. 0 . )
'
8
.
-r o " ij ,• i . JJ
°
'
,
/;.:•
.
•
'
0 .. i j . -1 ~
'
.
-
•
: : •
•
3i w lo 38 ?i;0 •-> . • , ' J • . O
/ • o l o r i ; <
'
'
.
‘
-
. >-
'
.
• 8
.
- Ii .... . •
. ..
-
•
'
•
’
;
- 1 : ' Zi f
.
-
>oJtTl - ..
.
. . .
Of). - o • nno . . 0: I ,
.
-v
Hie further serious decline in interest rates
during 1943 - 1946 renewed interest of insurance companies
in this program of building up a strong current position.
The Equitable Life of New York has been one of its most
active proponents and users. Mr. Thomas I. Parkinson,
President of this company, in a speech in late 1945 called
attention to the fact that an investor who pays 2 3/4 per
cent for a thirty year public utility bond will find that
he has lost about fifteen points in five years if the
interest rate then goes to 3|r per cent; (1) during 1946
it has been reported that Equitable’s policy called for
a big increase in investments in short-term Governments.
The Prudential, New York Life and John Hancock are among
the other larger companies which adapted a similar policy
during 1946.
5. Slight De teriora tion in Quality of Inves tments
Although, as mentioned earlier in this report,
insurance companies have been forced by circumstances to
put a smaller percentage of their investment monies into
the higher grade bonds, the comparison of acquisitions by
the three larger life companies in 1940 and 1945, of bonds
offered publicly, and of holdings of rated corporate bonds
by the John Hancock for the same years, shown in Figure
twenty, seems to indicate that in general the portfolios
(1) Thomas I. Parkinson, Low Interes t Ha tes and Public
welfare op. cit. p. 2364
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of these companies were about as strong, from an over-all
quality standpoint, at the end of 1945 as they were five
years earlier. In the case of railroad bonds, the three
companies acquired fewer "AM” and bonds in 1945 than
in 1940, but a much larger percentage of nkn bonds so that
the total acquisitions of bonds with a rating of ttAn or
better during the two yesrs was almost identical (72.8
per cent). Moreover, the increase in the proportion of
railroad bonds with a quality rating of UB W and ac-
quired in 1940 was sufficient to offset the decline in
,f3 ,r railroads, so that the proportion of ‘’CCC* 1 and UCC ,T
bonds was only 1.6 per cent in the two years under review.
The picture as far as public utility issues is concerned
is very strong in both years, with 97.5 per cent of the
acquisitions of bonds in this field in 1945 of "A” quality
or better compared with 98.0 per cent in 1940. In the
industrial and miscellaneous classification, an increase
of purchases of "iBB 11 and ub u bonds (12.0 per cent in 1940
and 24.7 per cent in 1945) did drive down the proportion
of bonds with a rating of "A n or better from 88.0 per cent
. to 75.3 per cent. This trend in industrial investments,
which have been increasing in relative importance, is re-
flected in the chart covering total corporate bonds pur-
chased publicly, where we see that 81.9 per cent of pur-
chases in 1945 were in the three highest rating groups,
as against 85.4 per cent in 1940, a decline of 3.5 per cent.
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However, the various grades of bonds in the next major
quality grouping ( wBBB ,f , ‘'SB*1 and WB H ) took up this slack,
with the result that there was only a negligible increase
in the percentage of bonds purchased below a "B tt grade
(0.7 per cent in 1940 8nd 0.9 per cent in 1945).
Thus far we have been considering the quality of
new securities added to insurance company portfolios. An-
other slant on the quality of investments is obtained by
studying the total holdings of a typical company on Decem-
ber 31, 1940 and 1945. Two features of the last double bar
in Figure twenty seem to stand out. The first is that the
portfolio of this company included a slightly smaller per-
centage of nAAAM
,
“AA 1* and MAn bonds at the end of 1945
than at the end of 1940, 73.4 per cent against 77.1 pea
cent. The second is that bonds with a rating of less than
,fB 11 (8.5 per cent in 1940) have been cleaned out of the
portfolio and replaced by those with ’'BBS 11
,
"BB" and ,fB u
ratings which represented 26.6 per cent of the total holdings
at December 31, 1945, compared with 14.4 per cent in 1940 —
an indication of the overall strengthening of this company's
investment position.
It should be stressed that all of the above figures
regarding the quality of insurance investments are based on
the so-called public issues. Ratings on securities bought
privately. In general, are not available but, since, as
a rv.le,, the very strict standards outlined in Section II
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are applied to them, it seems safe to assume that they
add strength, rather than weakness, to insurance company
portfolios
.
As has been suggested earlier, the slight
deterioration in the quality of insurance investments may
be attributed to a considerable extent to the need for a
more reasonable return on invested monies than has been
obtainable from "AAa" securities. The investment situation
for the smaller companies has been even more difficult than
for the larger ones. With the latter literally "gobbling
up" the limited volume of more desirable issues, only the
investment "crumbs" have been left for the others. In
scraping up these left-overs, it is obvious that some life
companies have had to compromise their quality standards
in order to find any outlets whatsoever for their invest-
ment funds. However, the noteworthy point is not so much
that the quality of investments appears to have declined
somewhat but that, in the face of the terrific pressure for
an ample ana reasonable return on invested funds, the deterior-
ation has not been more extensive. Moreover, based on the
figures presented above, which it is admitted are very limited
in scope, it seems entirely possible that from a long-r8nge
point of view portfolios are being strengthened by the
gradual elimination of bonds with a rating of "CCC" and lower.
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B. Developments Which May Influence Inves tment
Policies and Portfolios in the Future
1. Fur ther Broadening of "Legal" Investment Lis ts
The future undoubtedly holds in store many changes
and developments in the institutional investment field.
Without a crystal ball or the mind of a prophet, it is im-
possible to foretell exactly what the future course and
trends will be. However, a few of the possibilities and/or
probabilities are worthy of note.
In the first place, the trend of the various
States seems to be toward broadening the types of invest-
ments which may be made by insurance companies. The predica-
ment of these institutions apparently has been driven home
in the minds of the legislators who now are taking action
to open new outlets for insurance funds. Massachusetts is
considering the advisability of including mortgage bonds
of water, gas and independent telephone companies on Its
list of "legal" investments, as well as a larger range of
railroad issues. Connecticut recently broadened its in-
surance laws to permit its domestic insurance companies to
invest 5 per cent of their assets in any type of security,
including common stocks, selected by their financial officers
and committees. In the real estate investment field, Cali-
fornia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and New York have
adopted provisions permitting companies to acquire and hold
real estate as an investment for the production of income.
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and it is believed that many other states will follow their
lead. All of these various modifications of the statutes
indicate that the states are approaching and trying to help
solve the investment problems of the insurance companies in
a realistic and straightforward manner, and that, as a result,
the financial officers of the life companies are going to be
able to find adequate and safe outlets for their ever-increas-
ing funds.
2. Improved Ha tes on Government Securities and Increased
Offerings of Long-term Government 3 ond
s
A second possible development which should be
mentioned is that continued pressure by institutional in-
vestors on the United States Treasury may bring about an
improvement in the fiscal policies of the Federal Govern-
ment. For some time insurance company executives have been
attempting to convince the Government that the present low
rates are detrimental not only to the insurance companies
but also to the general welfare of the country and its people
in the long run. These efforts, thus far, hsve not been
particularly fruitful since the Treasury’s primary concern
seems to be to keep the carrying charges on the present
National Debt as low as possible. However, if the battle
on this front is supported by research and publicity on the
part of the actuaries regarding the intricate role of interest
in the life insurance structure, some financial men still
feel that it may be possible to break down the Government’s
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resistance to higher rates. The Treasury "might even see
fit to adopt the rather old-fashioned policy of setting
the rate on new offerings for the purpose of getting the
maximum amount of funds from non-infla tionary sources
instead of paying the minimum amount of interest". (1)
Furthermore, as time goes by, inflationary pressures may
force the Federal Reserve System to give up its policy
of buying unlimited amounts of Treasury Certificates in an
effort to hold the rate on them down. (2) Some financial
men believe that, notwiths tanding its currently avowed
policy, the Treasury eventually "will wish to correct the
present unbalance between long and short maturities by the
offering of fairly large amounts of long-term securities".
(3) Any of these steps will be favorable to and welcomed
enthusias tically by the insurance companies.
(1) I.turray Shields, Inflation , Interes t Ra tes and Invest-
ment Policy * Bank of the Manhattan Company, New York,
New York, 1946. p. 15.
(2) Loc . cit.
(3)
Loc. cit.
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C. Potential Invea tment Trend a
1. More Divera iflea tlon of Inves tment
Partly as a result of the changes in state laws
and partly the consequence of a more agrees ive search for
profitable investments, the future should find insurance
portfolios more diversified than in the past. As the hold-
ings of Government bonds decrease in relative importance,
funds will flow into a wider variety of securities than
ever before. Typical of this trend which has already started
is the large volume of industrial loans being made by Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia. In 1941 that
company’s miscellaneous industrial obligations were
$21,019,000; in 1945 they were $63,302,300. (1) Mr. William
W. Bodine, Penn’s financial vice president in discussing this
growth explained.
There is a great deal of satisfaction
in Industrial loans. There is no
special pattern -- we just fit the
loan to the client like a tailor-
made suit.... You have to be flexible
and provide the right service to the
client. (2)
The financing' of farmers’ cooperative associations
may provide further diversification of insurance portfolios.
Such associations hold a very Important position in the
marketing of farm products and the purchasing of supplies
(1) Inves tor ’
s
Reader, October 4, 1946.
(2) Log. cit
.
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and have attained considerable prominence in certain parts
of the United States. However, since they are mutual or-
ganizations which are ov/ned and operated by the members,
they present many peculiar financing problems. (1) At
least one insurance company (John Hancock) is known to have
entered this field already with a sizable loan to a large
eastern farmers’ cooperative. Others will find it profit-
able to undertake similar financing.
Another potential investment outlet which will
help to implement this policy of greater diversification
in portfolios of the life companies will be the securities
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
which will amount to about ^7,600,000,000 (2) It is estimated
that about <,'pi ,000,000,000 of this total will be available
to United States investors. (3) Although the laws of many
states now preclude investment by insurance companies in
securities of the world bank, the Bank itself is sponsoring
model legislation in each state to enable financial institu-
tions to invest in its bonds. (4) These securities will be
(1) Twenty -sixth Annual Report of the Na tional Bureau of
Economic Research
,
Inc., New York, N.Y., 1946. p. 68.
(2) Survey of Current Business , February 1946
(3) The Outlook for Interest Ra tea , op. cit. p. 3.
(4) Ka tional Underwrl ter , October 11, 1946. p. 35.
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backed not only by the obligations of the countries to which
loans are made but also by the obligations of the member
countries on their capital contributions. (1) Every effort
is being made to make the securities of the Bank as attrac-
tive as possible both by establishing a reasonable rate and
by building up confidence of investors through the pursuit
of a sound loan policy.
In addition to loans to the Bank itself, there is
also the possibility for private investors to make direct
loans to countries holding membership in the Bank. The Ar-
ticles of Agreement provide that the bank may guarantee,
in whole or in part, such loans made through customary in-
vestment channels. (2)
2, More Careful Attention to Ma turities
During the last few years, most insurance companies
have ignored or given only minor consideration to the arrange-
ment of maturities of their holdings. With new offerings
running very low in volume and inves table funds constantly
increasing, the companies have bought almost any sound issue
which offered a reasonable return, and gave little or no
attention to the matter of staggering maturities. As a
result, according to one of the investment officers of one
of the larger insurance companies, 75 per cent of the bonds
(1) Report, dated November 1, 1946, of Mr. Collado, U. S.
Executive Director of the International Bank.
(2) Loc . cit.
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now in the portfolio of that company mature more than
twenty year? from now#
If available investments increase substantially
in volume, as it is expected they will during the next few
years, serious attention will have to be paid to the matters
of matching up maturities with prospective needs for funds
or of staggering maturities so that regular amounts will
come due at regular intervals. Unless such action is taken,
the companies at some future date will find themselves
forced with the problem of investing within a short period
of time the huge sems realized on the maturity of a large
percentage of their holdings. If interest rates and the
volume of available investments both happen to be low at
that time, the investment difficulties will be aggravated
as the various insurance companies make a wild scramble to
buy up whatever securities may be offered.
3. Es tablishment of Reserve for Inves tmen t Losses
An actuary has suggested that funds arising from
capital g8ins and interest in excess of what may be considered
true interest or compensation for the use of capital should
.be segregated from the general surplus arising from strictly
insurance operations. (1) In recent years, as has been
mentioned previously, many bonds have been redeemed at sub-
stantial premiums which have given the investors unexpected
(1) vVendell P. Coler, An Actuary Looks a t Investments ,
address before the American Life Convention, Chicago,
Illinois, October 1943.
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profits. Many insurance companies have realized other
sizable profits by selling totally or partially tax
exempt bonds at prices considerably above their costs.
There appears to be a growing conviction that
these "windfall" profits plus the portion of the interest
charged as compensation for risk of loss of principal
should be set aside as a reserve for meeting future invest-
ment losses. Although there are no "experience tables"
with reference to investment mortality so that it is im-
possible to determine accuragely how large such a reserve
should be, conservatism and the part of wisdom seem to
indicate that some provision will be made for such rather
certain contingencies.
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V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The financial strength and stability of United
States life insurance companies is of vital importance to
the 100,000,000 and more Americans who are policyholders
and beneficiaries of life insurance! (1) Consequently,
the utmost care and efficiency must be exercised in the
investment of life insurance funds to insure that all con-
tractual obligations of the policies may be met and that
the cost of insurance protection is kept to a minimum. As
an institution, life insurance has established for itself
an enviable reputation and a seemingly unassailable finan-
cial position.
However, during the past decade and a half, econ-
omic changes which center around the narrowing opportunities
for investment in private enterprise and the increased im-
portance of government securities as an investment outlet,
have cut drastically the earnings of the domestic life in-
surance companies. After deducting investment expenses from
investment income, the net earnings on investments in 1930
for forty-nine domestic life companies amounted to 5.03 per
cent of their mean ledger assets, while in 1945 the corres-
ponding rate was 3.09 per cent, a decline of 40 per cent
(1) Dave D. Satterfield, Jr. on. cit . p. 3
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in the productivity of life insurance funds within sixteen
years
. (1) This drastic drop in interest earnings has not
only narrowed the “margin of safety*' for insurance companies
(ie., the difference between the rate required to maintain
reserves and the rate earned) but also has increased mater-
ially the financial burdens of the great body of American
policyholders by reducing the amount of their dividends and
by increasing their oremium payments on new contracts. An
ever-mounting volume of funds to be invested as a result of
an increase of 46 per cent in life insurance in force and of
137 per cent in total assets of the life companies, and the
limitation on investment outlets imposed by state laws have
served to aggravate the problems and difficulties of in-
surance companies during the period 1930 - 1946.
have reflected the rapidly-shifting economic conditions as
well as the unfortunate developments in the international
picture which culminated in World War II. United States
Government Bonds, of course, which have been in the lime-
light durin; most of the pest fifteen or sixteen years in-
creased from 2 per cent of insurance companies assets at
the end of 1930 to 46 per cent at the end of 1945; railroad
securities took a sharp nose-dive in popularity, while policy
loans and mortgages on both farm and city property, likewise
The investment portfolios of the life companies
(1) Loc . cit.
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showed a drastic decline in relative importance. Public
utility bonds and stocks have just about held their own and
industrial and miscellaneous securities have registered
definite gains. Preferred and common stocks have won favor
in some insurance companies as a means of combatting the down-
ward trend of income received from the old-line investments.
This purchasing of stocks is only one of many
aggressive steps taken by investment officers of the life
companies in recent years. Interest rates on policy loans
have been reduced to attract some of the small loan business
which has been going to a large degree to banks and other
lending agencies; broadening of legal lists of the states
has been sought and, in many cases, won so that new potential
outlets for insurance funds, such as income-producing real
estate, now are being utilized to an increasing extent;
quality standards have been modified slightly to permit
acquisition of securities providing a more reasonable rate
of return than is obtainable on those at the top of the
list; opportunities for private purchases of securities on
wnich a better-.than-a verage rate of interest is p8 id are
being more actively sought by many companies; and Canadian
investments have won favor because of the higher coupon
rates and the possibility of increasing the return still
more if exchange rates between this country and Canada
remain in the same relative position as at present.
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The future investment policy of the life insurance
companies will continue to be influenced by many of the above
considerations but emphasis will be pieced also on other
factors. In the first place, pressure on the United States
Treasury for higher rates on government bonds and the re-
funding of outstanding short-term obligations which are
considered inflationary with long-term securities seems likely
to be renewed and increased. Secondly, more careful con-
sideration must be given to quality so that only the securities
of corporations most likely to weather the storms and vicissi-
tudes of the economic environment will be added to port-
folios. More intelligent diversification of risk should be-
come another of the cardinal principles of investment policy
as new types of investments, such as securities of farmers'
cooperatives and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development become available. Furthermore, the notion
that "maturity doesn't mean anything any more" which has been
prevalent for many years, will need to be replaced by the
realisation that the practice of staggering maturities will
be advantageous and necessary as soon as rates tiirn upward.
(1) In addition, the prospect of a transition from a buyers'
to a sellers' market for funds "suggests that the long-range
budgeting and planning of investment needs is essential". (2)
Finally, there appears to be much which can be said in favor
(1) Murrey Shields, _on. ci
t
. p. 16
(2) Loc . cit.
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of a policy of setting aside as a special reserve fund for
meeting future investment losses, the capital gains result-
ing- fr ora the redemption of investments at a premium plus
interest in excess of what may be considered true interest
or compensation for the use of capital* (1)
Competition among insurance companies and other
large investors for satisfactory investments --those offer-
ing security of principal and a reasonable rate of return --
seems destined to continue and probably will grow more in-
tense during the coming years. However, as the president
of one of the medium-sized life companies puts it:
There are still good investments paying
a reasonable return but they are not
coming in the door. The insurance com-
pany investor must go out and look for
them. (2)
Although the challenge to investment officers who are ever
conscious of their responsibilities as '‘trustees” is perhaps
greater now than ever before, their reputa t ion, record
,
and
past experience provide a sound basis for believing that the
investments of the tremendous institutions which they repre-
sent will be administered and managed as efficiently in the
future 8s in the past. Nevertheless, economic conditions
may make the yield lower so that increased premiums will have
to compensate for low earnings. Thus the insurance companies’
(1) Wendell P. Coler, An Actuary hooks a t Inves tments
,
adoress before the American Life Convention, Chicago, 111.
October 1945.
(2) ha tlonal Underwriter , February 21, 1947, p. 14
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dilemma becomes increased risk in investments and maintenance
of present premium rates, _or observance of current safety-
standards and adoption of higher premium rates. If the for-
mer policy is followed, the investment officers of insurance
companies v/ho have established an enviable record must be
even more efficient in the future than they are now, in
order to keep the record of capital losses on investments
as favorable as they have been for many decades l
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APPENDIX

(~TAB A)
INVESTMENTS OF 49 UNITED STATES LEGAL
iNSUR4flC£ COMMIES.TTfT
-INVESTMENTS—»Y CLASSES
Dae. 11 Farm Mortalaas Otksr Mom
1920 1.127.903,000 7 161 1.1 11.750.000
1921 1420.902.000 i 17.7 i 1442.126.000
1922 1,455,025.000 i 1*4 i 1.195.420.000
1921 1.664.551.000 i 10.9 i 1.670.451.000
1924 14054*2.000 i 10.7 i 2.004.090.000
1921 14*1.165.000 < 17.7 i 2.486,529,000
1926 1,951.111.000 i 164 i 1.111.171.000
1927 1,977,410,000 i 11.1 i 1.660,499,000
192* 1.955.946.000 i 11.1 1 44*6410.000
1929 1.926.600,000 12.0 i 4.794.664.000
1910 1.881.246.000 10.9 l 1,106.451.000
1911 1.612.742.000 10 0 i 14J6.I96.000
1912 1.706.959.000 i 9.0 i 5.061.912.000
1911 1.106.570.000 i 7.0 i 4.741.646.000
1914 1,191,626.000 6.0 i 4.108.601.000
1915 9894 50.000 4 6 i 1.962.660.000
1916 666.496.000 1 1.0 > 1.816.972.000
1917 811,601.000 1 1.4 1.944,062,000
1910 600,167,000 l 1.2 I 4,116.170,000
1919 790.629,000 i 1.0 i 4.110.491,000
1940 768.911.000 l 2.0 4.550.051.000
1941 602.119.000 i 2.7 l 4.904.756,000
1941 7(0,045,000 2 1 l 5.144.966.000
1941 740.961.000 2 1 5.I51.11S.OOO
1944 698.709,000 1 9 i.l !«. 172,000
1945 666.064.000 ( 1 6 5.015.! 18.000
71946 670.000.000 ( 1.5 ) 5455.000,000
TsaaJ
2U4I.6S1.000
2U6J.02t.000
2410.41 1.000
1.111.006.000
1.009.600.000
4.171.094.000
5.002.404.000
1417.917.000
6424.196.000
6.721.472.000
6.991.697.000
7.060.910.000
6.700.071.000
6.240.210.000
1.100.227.000
4.912.110.000
4.701.460.000
4.717.001.000
4.910.117.000
1
.
121
.
122.000
1.110.964.000
1.706.071.000
1.911.011.000
1.094496.000
S.Mift.HOi.ono
5.701. 182.000
5,925,000.000
12.1
14.1
11.2
17.*
19.1
41.0
41.0
42.1
42.1
42.0
40.1
10.4
11.0
12.4
27.4
214
20 1
10.7
19.4
19.1
i
lt.O
I*. I
10.6
17.1
15.7
(14.1
<11.7
O.S.
2*64*7400
too 006 000
0411642.000
709.679.000
600.167.000
611.611.000
400.190400
440.199.000
191471.000
116.110.000
101400.000
111.111.000
421409.000
004.067400
1.717.111.000
2.722.067.000
14*1.706.000
4.161.292.000
4.646.111.000
1.062.929.000
1.4924*2.000
6.414.151.000
0.719.407.000
11497.619.000
15.275.927.000
10.951.416.000
19.075.000.000
10.4
|
1.4
2.7
24
14
1.9
2.2
44
0.6
12.7
16.1
10.1
10.2
<10.9
<1*4
<21.4
(27.4
<14.0
<41:0
<46.0
<46.0
Dm. 11
1920
1921
1922
1921
1924
1925
1926
1927
1920
1929
1910
1911
1912
1911
1914
1915
1916
1917
1910
1914
1940
1941
1942
194]
|'<44
I !
t I >46
Stair. County, and
Municipal Bond#
288.2 19.<
146.961.000
144.571.000
110.177.000
142.697.000
154.141.000
141.171.000
155.700.000
412.720.000
519.949.000
505.211.000
691.171.000
710.191.000
000.590.000 <4 2
1.015.211.000 (5 0
1,169.790 000 ( 5 5
1.100.221.000 <5.7
1.401.176.000 ( 5 0
1.497.151.000 <59
1,649.6>,|,000 ( 6.1
1.777.106.000 ( 6 1
1.696.02! 000 (5 7
1.471. 100.000 <4 6
1.210.411.000 <1 !
696 IMOM <2 4
170,4! 1.000 (I 4
440.000.000 (1 0 14
^i.lM.OWTTI 1 101,286.000 i 14 1 1410496.000 19.2
157.149.000 <2 1 i 110.646.000 i 14 1 1.414.964.000 19 0
191.421.000 <2 4 64.469.000 i 14 1 1.466.105.000 10.1
216.512.000 (2.5 i 59.628.000 i .1 i 1496.196.000 16.0
225.044.000 <24 41.124.000 i 4 i 1499,012.000 IIS
246.546 000 (24 17.195.000 i .4 i 1469.497.000 i II *
264.615.000 (2.2 i 10.224,000 < 4 1 1,127.420,000 i 9.1
104.408.000 (24 i 12.624,000 4 1 1.111.119.000 i 0.7
117.0J2.000 <24 i 15.498.000 .2 i 1.177,111,000 i to
J72.715.000 <24 16.197.000 4 i I46j.4II.00O i 79
401.956,000 <24 i J2.829.000 .2 l 1.125. 196.OOO l 7.7
441.228.000 <2.4 l 11.519.000 .2 i 1,521.651.000 i 0.1
448.157.000 <2.4 1 24.711.000 .1 i 1.612.470.000 i 0.6
419.898,000 <24 17.029.000 .1 i 2.070.164.000 l 10.0
419.670.000 (2 2 1 14.960.000 i .1 1 1407.594.000 l 159
469.164.000 <2.2 1 ll.J92.000 i
.1 i 4.174.411.000 I 20 1
476.674,000 (2 1 1 10.628.000 1 •< i 5.479.509.000 24 0
481.550.000 <2.0 1 6.179.000 I
.0 i 6456.197.000 1 219
499.408.000 <2 0 i 7,019.000 l .0 i 6.649.911.000 24.1
511.481.000 (2 0 i 6.181.000 i
.0 7412416.000 274
562.562.000 (2.0 1 1,691.000 1 .0 7.(18.721,000 27.7
621.275.000 <2 1 1 i.Ul.OOO
.0 0.741.006.000 291
709.164.000 (2 1 1 1.221.000 4 10.925.160.000 i 141
880.111.000 <2 6 > S. 501.000 < .0
'
11.791.720.000 40 1
0**0.04 1,000 <2 7 1.818,<nw) i .0 17.168.166.000 46.1
.117.800.000 <2 8 i 64M .rxio i .0 20.640.751.000 < 114
.227,000.000 <2.9 8.000.000 1 .0 21.550.000.000 ( 49.9
Das. II
1*2*
1*21
1923
1921
1*24
1*21
1926
1*27
1*26
1*29
1910
1911
1913
1911
10M
1911
1914
1917
1910
1919
1940
1941
1942
1941
1944
1945
tl>46
* Railroad
da and Stocks
Ik Utility
and Sack*
•Otksr
-E7fl.oa.6M
1.710.651.000
1.016.122.000
1.911.540.000
2.109462.000
2444.551.000
2.411.050.000
2.561.105.000
2.710.126.000
2.040.411.000
2.946.676.000
2.995.670.000
2.919.570.000
24*0.5 10.000
2.912.741.000
2.675.740.000
2.911.165.000
1U50.169.000
2.969.252.000
2.945.906.000
2.991.010.000
2.906.957.000
2.701.410.000
2.750.207.000
2.694. 142.000
2.620.* 10 **>
2.790.000.000
2 15.722.000
221.101.000
260.920.000
112.922.000
447.559.000
419.455.000
011.910.000
1.076.111.000
1.125.111.000
1.450.100.000
1.675.106.000
1411 . 161.000
1.607.412.000
1426.100.000
1.926.922.000
2.1 70.601.000
2.162.119.000
2422.921.000
1477.069.000
1.771.196.000
4.196.752.000
4.774419.000
5.041417.000
5.059429.000
5.099.455.000
4.947.561.000
5.a 5.000.000
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.0
4.6
1.0
6.9
04
9.1
9.1
9.7
9.0
9.1
9.1
9.6
10.
1
114
11.7
12.9
14.1
14.9
11.9
ISO
14.7
(II 7
<122
<12.7
90.121.000 <14
99.702.000 <1.1
1 01 407.000 <
1 16.904.000
111416.000
119.610.000
169.011400
211.196.000
112440.000
412447.000
142.760.000
591.110.000
590.661.000
500.911400
660
.
019.000
700 .610.000
932441.000
1410.569.000
1.500.192.000
1.565495.000
1.771419.000
2.069.740.000 ( 6.9
J.059.110.000 (64
2.114.614.000 (64
2.117.190.000 <5.7
2441.611.000 <5.6
1,700,000,000 <6.6
WOKMl6.778.000
14M.742.000
1.779410.000
1.991.429.000
4491.111.000
4424.191.000
4.964.011.000
1.113.420.000
1.976.191.000
6.490.110.000
6.924414400
4.970.1! 1.000
7.167.907.000
8.707.117.000
10409.196.000
11.097.474.000
11.120410400
1 4.196.62 4. (XX)
11417.011.000
16.000.
144.000
16.570.922.000
2O.6O9.157400
21.718.478.000
27.009, ]75,0°0
30.612.959.000
11.525.000.
000

CTAf3*-£ A - st.svnMje*))
-amamaam-n " »— ccmma
Dac.lt awl Prcmiun Nofet Baal Ratal
1920 926. 49ft.000 11.9 137,363.000 (2.0
1921 970.148.000 l 11.0 i 147,162.000 2.0
1922 1,039.500.000 i 12.9 1 151.489.000 1.9
1923 1,102.398.000 1 12 3 i 159.591.000
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1.287.312.000
12.3
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19)9 2.501.495,000 i 14.3 l 404.590.000 2.4
1931
1933
3.002.449.000 i
3.409.324.000
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1933
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3.422.049.000 I
3.302.294.000 I
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1.930.869.000 8.0
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1919 2.898,691.000 i 109 1.896.975.000 7.1
1940 2.748.038.000 I 9.7 l 1.826.638.000 6.5
1941 2.182.27H.000 i 8 6 1.643.564.000 3.5
1942 2.163.710.000 i 7.4 l 1.448.995.000 (4.5
194J 2.0*6.428.000 i 6.1 i 1.170.957.000 (3.4
1944 1.871.659.000 5.0 1 922.785.000 (2.5
1941 1.715.666.000 4.2 1 728.796.000 (1.8
1944 1 .615,000.000 3 8 625.000.000 (1.5
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l*2t
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12.155.000
11.172.000
963,000
1.176,000
155.000
1.119400
13.491.000
11.667.000
11414.000 1.118.000 1.686.000 14,658.000
1*22 11,967.000 1428.000 1,090,000 14,885.000
It24 9.651.000 2,185,000 1421.000 11.461.000
ins *401.000 2448.000 2,000,000 14.049,000
is 9.902,000 3,022.000 1.543.000 14,467,00011,969.000 6.695.000 2,649,000 21,111,000
1928 25.547.000 41,398.000 52.111,000 119.476.000
1*2* 40.110.000 •2464.000 110.144,000 212,718.000
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1*22 66,996.000 153.764,000 1*4.522.000 415482.000
1*11 66.1 50.000 155.481.000 185,853,000 407.484.000
1*14 66.Ml.000 137.198.000 188,482.000 411,981,000
1*15 65.691.000 164412.000 201417.000 411,442,000
1*16 66.518.000 161,077,000 188.067,000 417.682,000
1917 61.667.000 158,198,000 209,438.000 4M.741.000
1918 55465.000 156,154.000 199.163.000 410.782.000
1*1* 49.761.006 142.992.000 201416.000 395.989,000
1*«0 46,147,000 119.929.000 206.042.000 394.118.000
1*41 Sl.719.000 142.912.000 214.169,000 408.840,000
1*42 46.148.000 141.607,000 221.97S.0OO 411.710.000
1*41 45422.000 140.516.000 71042*.000 416.597.000
1*44 55.620.000 119.511.000 258.887,000 454.018.000
1*45 <6.677400 168,712.000 146.817.000 582,226.000
fl*46 66,000.000 214,000.000 415,000,000 715,000,000
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l*M
m*
1*40
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21.061.000
17.179.000
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24.810.000
24.8*7.000
26.182.000
24.059.000
21.726.000
22.481.000
22.552.000
20.181.000
19.151.000
21432.000
22,6*6,000
21.112.000
16.694.000
19.818.000
19.166.000
18.715.000
16.71J.000
25.000.000
COMMON
Public Utility
11,118.000
10,4*1.000
7.779.000
6.540.000
5.776.000
6.566.000
6.115.000
5.050.000
5451.000
8.114.000
10.970.000
12.779.000
12419.000
12.114.000
12.218.000
14.619.000
19461.000
21.016.000
22.459.000
24.650.000
25.102.000
26.791.000
26.711.000
25**485,000
29.265.000
29.518.000
64.000.000
11.997.000
27.200.000
17455.000
14.045.000
15.544.000
48491.000
51.007.000
48.112.000
29.469.000
55.165.000
59.510.000
*1.805.000
62.079.000
62.156.000
61411.000
61.*54,000
*6,461.000
61.547.000
68.096.000
74457.000
80.816.000
80487.00*
84.078.000
84.908.000
90.481.000
‘ 102.886.000
ill noo OOO
Tutal
68.178.000
55.000,000
52.241.000
57.l6f.000
58.724.000
72486.000
75.112.000
66 124 000
51.167.000
06.129.000
*5.177.000
96.916.000
**,125,000
105.906.000
I01.916.00t
114.107.000
121471400
129.050.000
124. 179.000
110.607.000
129.659.000
118.461.000
150.957.000
210.000.000
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1*62
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28.541.000
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27.028.000
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*1.882.000
• 1,055,000
•*.876.000
88.782.000
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64.900.000
74.111.000
• 5.410,000
89.OUO.OOV
TOTAL
PubLc Utility
I2.M1.000
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7.961.000
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165.165 ouo
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168.118.000
166.021.000
168.776.000
196.050.000
278,000.000
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